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John Yukio Gotandda
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the compensation policies of
internationalarbitrators. Specifically, the Article details the
results of a survey of individuals who practice in the area of
internationalarbitration.
Initially, the Article describes the different methods of
calculating the fees of the arbitral tribunal, discussing the
relative advantagesand disadvantagesof each method. The
study concludes that most arbitrators calculate their fees
using a time-based method, except when the arbitral
institution requires that their fees be determined under the
ad valorem method.
Next, the Article examines arbitrators'policies regarding
cancellation and commitment fees.
Survey results
highlighted confusion about whether arbitrators were
prohibited by a jurisdiction's laws or ethical rules. In
addition, many commentators debate the propriety of such
fees. The survey results reveal that most arbitratorsdo not
charge cancellation or commitment fees. While practitioners
in certain jurisdictions more routinely charge these fees,
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charging such fees is not widespread in continental Europe
or the United States.
The Article then addresses the implications for U.S.
arbitratorswho are considering the adoption of cancellation
and commitment fees. Although most arbitralinstitutions do
not explicitly permit such fees, institutional guidelines are
broad enough to allow for such fees. Furthermore, because
arbitrators are not fiduciaries in the same manner as
lawyers who are employed by clients, the policy behind the
ban on nonrefundable special retainerswould not be served
by applying it to prohibit arbitrators from charging
cancellation or commitment fees. Finally, the Article argues
that none of the rules or codes governing the conduct of
arbitratorsin internationalarbitrationsexpressly prohibit the
payment of cancellation or commitment fees. As a result, if
such fees are reasonable, the Author contends that they
should be permissible.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In international commercial arbitrations, the fees of the
arbitral tribunal can be considerable.'
For example, a dispute
involving $100 million and a panel of three arbitrators appointed
under the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
could result in arbitrators' fees totaling $780,000.2 Despite the
significant amounts involved, little is known about the process for

1.
Walter G. Gans, Saving Time and Money in Cross-Border Commercial
Disputes, in ADR & THE LAW 321, 324 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Fordham Int'l L.J. &
Fordham Urb. L.J. eds., 1997); Andrew I. Okekeifere, Commercial Arbitration as
the Most Effective Dispute Resolution Method: Still a Fact or Now a Myth?, 15 J.
INT'L ARB. 81, 87 (1998).
2.
W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CRAIG, PARK &
PAULSSON'S

ANNOTATED

GUIDE TO

THE

1998

ICC

ARBITRATION

RULES

WITH

COMMENTARY app. B, at 223 (1998) (Illustrative Calculation of Administrative
Expenses and Arbitrator's Fees).
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remunerating arbitrators in international disputes. Indeed, there
has been relatively scant commentary on the methods for
determining the arbitrators' fees and the types of fees that they
may charge, such as cancellation or commitment fees. Yet, these
fees have been quite controversial and the subject of much debate
in the international arbitral community.
In spring 2000, the author undertook a survey of arbitrators
around the world to determine how they calculate their fees and
what types of fees they charge. In particular, the survey sought
to determine: (1) the methods that are used to determine the
arbitrators' remuneration, (2) whether the practice of charging
cancellation or commitment fees is widespread, and (3) the
reasons that arbitrators cite for charging or not charging
particular fees. The results were surprising.
What the survey found is that most arbitrators base their
fees on the amount of work performed, except when an arbitral
institution, such as the ICC, sets their fees based on a percentage
of the amount in dispute.
In addition, the survey revealed
significant variations among jurisdictions on the question of
whether arbitrators charge cancellation or commitment fees. For
example, it is common practice to charge cancellation or
commitment fees in the United Kingdom, while it is unusual to do
so in other European countries and in the United States. In
general, the survey respondents were often unsure about whether
cancellation
or commitment fees were prohibited by a
jurisdiction's laws or ethical rules; and there was considerable
debate among respondents over whether arbitrators should be
allowed to charge these fees.
This Article examines arbitrators' fees. Section II describes
the methods for determining the remuneration of an arbitral
tribunal and the types of fees that arbitrators may charge, with
particular emphasis on the practice of charging cancellation and
commitment fees. Section III discusses the methodology of the
survey and its results. Section IV focuses on its implications in
the United States, and predicts that the charging of cancellation
and commitment fees will become more prevalent in the United
States.

II. OVERVIEW
Under some systems, it is common for individuals to serve as
arbitrators on an unpaid basis. 3 This practice is rare, however, in

3.

THOMAS H. OEHMKE, OEHMKE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §

Supp.2000).

45:24 (rev. ed.
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international commercial arbitrations. 4
As a general rule,
arbitrators in international arbitrations are entitled to be
compensated for their work by the parties who appointed them,
5
unless they waive their fees.
The process for determining the fees of the arbitrators
depends initially on whether the method of arbitration is
institutional or ad hoc. In arbitrations conducted under the
auspices of an arbitral institution, the governing body often fixes
fees of the tribunal. 6 By contrast, in ad hoc arbitrations, the
parties negotiate directly with the arbitrators regarding their
fees. 7 While the type of arbitration may dictate the process used
to set the arbitrators' fees, there are various methods available to
calculate the fees. In addition, many arbitrators have recently
begun charging cancellation or commitment fees.

4.
See FOucHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 625 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).
5.

TIBOR VARADAY ET AL.,

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:

A

TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 315 (1999); Richard C. Reuben, ConstitutionalGravity:
A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47
UCLA L. REV. 949, 1068 (2000) (noting that individuals today commonly work fulltime as arbitrators in the United States and "charge hourly rates per party that
exceed their potential hourly rates within their professions").

6.
Francis Gurry, the Director of the World Intellectual
Organization Arbitration Center, explains:

Property

The determination of the fees payable to the arbitrators is one of the
principal functions of the administering authority. The administering
authority constitutes a buffer between the parties and the arbitrators,
thereby avoiding the necessity for the parties to engage directly in
negotiations with the arbitrators about fees with the consequent fear,
expressed by some, of offending the arbitrators or putting them off-side.
The determination of the arbitrators' fees takes place after
consultations between the administering authority and the arbitrators and
between the administering authority and the parties. The consultations
take place at the time of the appointment of the arbitrators.
Francis Gurry, Fees & Costs, 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 227, 230 (1995).

7.
It is generally accepted that the fees of the arbitrators should be agreed
upon at the outset of the proceedings and that, to avoid any suggestion of
impropriety, discussions concerning amounts to be paid to the arbitrators "should
only take place in the presence of all the parties to the dispute, or their
representatives."
ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 239 (3d ed. 1999). See also American

Arbitration Association Codes: The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes, Canon VI, in ADR & THE LAW, supra note 1, at 557, 565 ("It is preferable
that before the arbitrator finally accepts appointment the basis of payment be
established and that all parties be informed thereof in writing.").
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A. Methods of Calculatingthe Fees of the Arbitral Tribunal
In general, there are three methods of calculating the fees of
arbitrators in international commercial arbitrations: (1) the ad
valorem method; (2) the time-based method; and (3) the fixed fee
method.
1. Ad Valorem Method
Under the ad valorem method, the fees of the arbitrators are
based upon the amount in dispute. Typically, the arbitrators' fees
represent a percentage of the total amount in dispute. 8 This
method is commonly used by arbitral institutions to assess both
administrative fees and the fees of the arbitrators. 9
The ad
valorem method has the advantage of providing the parties with a
reasonable degree of certainty in estimating the arbitrators'
remuneration. Its main drawback, however, is that the fees may
be fixed without reference to the actual amount of time that the
arbitrators work on the case. As a result, the fees awarded may
seem too high or too low.' 0

8.
The amount in dispute typically consists of the sum of the petitioner's
claims, the respondent's counterclaims and set-offs. Michael Bfihler, Costs in ICC
Arbitration: A Practitioner'sView, 3 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 116, 123 (1992). In
administered arbitrations, if the amount of damages is unliquidated or not

stipulated, the amount in dispute is estimated by the arbitral institution. Id. at
124.
9.
Arbitral institutions that use an ad valorem method for assessing the
fees of the arbitral tribunal include: the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce; the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Geneva; the
Chamber of National and International Arbitration of Milan; the ICC; International
Arbitral Centre of the Federal Economic Chamber, Vienna; the World Intellectual
Property Organization Arbitration Center; and the Zurich Chamber of Commerce.
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF THE ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (1999), available at http://www.chamber.se/

arbitration/english/rules/sccrules.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2000); CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE & INDUS. OF GENEVA (CCIG), ARBITRATION RULES (1992), reprinted in 18
Y.B. COM. ARB. 195 (1993); CHAMBER OF NAT'L & INT'L ARBITRATION OF MILAN, MILAN
CHAMBER

OF

COMMERCE,

INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION

RULES,

available at

http://www.mi camcom. it/eng/arbitration.chamber/reging.htm
(last visited
Sept. 25, 2000); INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (1998), reprinted in 22 Y.B. COM. ARB. 345
(1997) [hereinafter INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE]; FED. ECON. CHAMBER VIENNA, THE
NEW RULES OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL CENTRE
OF THE FEDERAL ECONOMIC CHAMBER OF VIENNA (1991), reprinted in 18 Y.B. COM.

ARB. 206 (1993); WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO ARBITRATION RULES (1994),
reprinted in 20 Y.B. COM. ARB. 340 (1995); INT'L ARBITRATION RULES OF ZURICH
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (1989), reprintedin ARB. MATERIALS, Mar. 1989, at 215.
10.
Eric A. Schwartz, The ICC Arbitral Process, Part IV: The Costs of ICC
Arbitration, 4 ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 8, 11 (1993) ("The Court regularly receives
complaints from arbitrators that their fees are too low and do not take sufficient
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The ICC is an example of an arbitral institution that utilizes
the ad valorem method but also permits some flexibility." Under
the ICC Rules, the International Court of Arbitration (ICC Court)
12
fixes the arbitrators' fees according to a scale of costs and fees.
The scale provides a range of maximum and minimum
arbitrators' fees that are calculated based on the amount in
dispute. The ICC Court may fix the fees of the tribunal at any
figure between the range established by the fee schedule, taking
into account "the diligence of the arbitrator[s], the time spent, the
rapidity of the proceedings, and the complexity of the
dispute .. ."13 To illustrate, under the ICC scale, a dispute
involving $1 million will result in each arbitrator receiving
between $11,250 and $53,500, while a dispute involving $100
million will result in each arbitrator receiving between $61,750
and $260,000.14 The ICC Rules also provide the ICC Court with
the discretion to "fix the fees of the arbitrators at a figure higher
or lower than that which would result from the application of the
relevant scale should this be deemed necessary due to the
exceptional circumstances of the case." 15 In practice, however,
16
the ICC Court rarely deviates from the scale.

account of the number of hours devoted by them to a case. Occasionally ... [the]
parties complain that the arbitrators' fees are too high."); Jacques Werner,
Remuneration of Arbitrators by the International Chamber of Commerce, J. INT'L
ARB., Sept. 1988, at 135, 135 (stating that under the ICC system "in the large
number of cases where the sum [involved in the dispute] is small or mediumsized, the arbitrators are underpaid" and noting that in one arbitration the ICC
Court "allocated to an arbitrator, who had spent more than 200 hours on a case,
fees of US $10,000").
II.
See generally W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION 39-45, 353-57 (2d ed. 1990).
12.
INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, arts. 30-3 1.
13.
Id. app. III, art. 2(2). One commentator notes that when the case
proceeds to a final award, the arbitrators' fees typically fall within the middle
range established by the ICC fee scale. Bihler, supranote 8, at 129-30.
14.
CRAIG ET AL., supra note 2, app. B at 223 (Illustrative Calculation of
Administration Expenses and Arbitrator's Fees). The ICC Rules provide that
"[w]here the parties have not agreed upon the number of arbitrators, the [ICC]
Court shall appoint a sole arbitrator, save where it appears to the Court that the
dispute is such as to warrant the appointment of three arbitrators." INT'L
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supranote 9, art. 8(2). Commentators note that "a rough
rule of thumb used by the ICC is to opt in favour of a three-member tribunal if the
amount in dispute is above a range of $1.5-3.0 million." JAN PAULSSON ET AL., THE
FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO ARBITRATION AND ADR 67 (2d rev. ed. 1999).
15.
INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, art. 31(2).
16.
Schwartz, supranote 10, at 10.
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2. The Time-Based Method
Under the time-based method, the fees of the arbitrators are
determined according to the amount of hours or days spent on
the arbitration. They may also be determined by a combination
method, where a daily rate is charged for hearing days and an
hourly rate is charged for work performed outside of the hearings.
The time-based method has the advantage of compensating the
arbitrators based on the actual amount of work performed. Its
main drawback is that it does not provide an incentive for

efficiency. 17
The time-based method is typically used in ad hoc
arbitrations.
It is also the system used by some arbitral
institutions,

Arbitration
(AAA).

such

as

(LCIA) and

the

London

the American

Court

of

International

Arbitration

Association

Under the LCIA Rules, the LCIA Court determines the

costs of the arbitration, including the fees of the arbitrators, in
accordance with its Schedule of Fees and Costs.'
Schedule of Fees and Costs provides:

s

The LCIA's

The Tribunal's fees will be calculated by reference to work done by its
members in connection with the arbitration and will be charged at rates
appropriate to the particular circumstances of the case, including its
complexity and the special qualifications of the arbitrators. The Tribunal
shall agree in writing upon fee rates conforming to this Schedule of Fees
and Costs prior to its appointment by the LCIA Court. The rates will be
advised by the Registrar to the parties at the time of the appointment of
the Tribunal, but may be reviewed annually if the duration of the
arbitration requires.
The fee rates shall be within the following bands: £800 to £2,000 per
normal working day and £100 to £250 per hour for periods less than or in
addition to a normal working day.
However, in exceptional cases, the rates may be higher or lower,
provided that, in such cases, (a) the fees of the Tribunal shall be fixed by
the LCIA Court on the recommendation of the Registrar, following

17.

Gurry, supra note 6, at 230. One commentator has noted:

The adoption of a rigid per diem system would tend to make... dynamic
arbitrators [who manage to lead parties to defining, presenting, and
arguing the cases rapidly] disappear, and bring out the plodders. To work
properly, the system must reward efficiency-not create an incentive for
arbitrators to make the game last longer. In international arbitration, the
danger exists that if only one of three arbitrators decides he wants the
proceedings to be prolonged, he will find ready means to do so.
CRAIG ET AL., supranote 11, at 40.
18.
LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARBITRATION, THE LCIA RULES, art. 28.1 (1998),
available at http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/rulecost/english.html (last modified
May 18, 2000).
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consultations with the arbitrator(s), and (b) the fees shall be agreed
19
expressly by all parties.

With regard to compensating
International Rules provide:

the

arbitrators,

the

AAA

Arbitrators shall be compensated based upon their amount of service,
taking into account their stated rate of compensation and the size and
complexity of the case. The administrator shall arrange an appropriate
daily or hourly rate, based on such considerations, with the parties and
with each of the arbitrators as soon as practicable after the
commencement of the arbitration. If the parties fail to agree on the terms
of compensation, the administrator shall establish an appropriate rate and
20
communicate it in writing to the parties.

In ad hoc arbitrations or where the institution does not fix
the arbitrators' fees in accordance with a fee schedule, the
arbitrators' rates vary depending on the status of the arbitrators,
the importance and complexity of the matter, and the prevailing
practice where they reside. 2 1 For example, an arbitrator in South
Africa indicated that he charges ZAR6000 (approximately $840)
per day for hearings or travel and ZAR600 (approximately $84)
per hour for other work performed in connection with the
arbitration.2 2 By contrast, in the United States, arbitrators in ad
hoc arbitrations typically charge between $1,500 and $4,000 per
normal working day and between $200 and $450 per hour for
preparatory work.2 3
It should also be noted that in some

19.
LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARBITRATION, SCHEDULE OF FEES AND COSTS, art.
4(a) (1998), available at http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/rulecost/english.htm
(last modified May 18, 2000).
20.
AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, art. 32
(effective Sept. 1, 2000), available at http://www.adr.org/rules/international/
AAA175-0900.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2000). For a discussion of how arbitrators
are compensated under the AAA's domestic arbitration rules, see OEHMKE, supra
note 3, §§ 39:01-39:05.
The new Commercial Arbitration Scheme Rules of the Chartered Institute of
Arbitrators uses a combination of the ad valorem and time-based methods to set
the arbitrators' fees. 2 CHARTERED INST. OF ARBITRATORS, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
SCHEME RULES, art. 9.2 (2000). Under these rules, if the total claim is (1)
£100,000 or less, the arbitrators' fees are set at £70 per hour; (2) between
£100,001 and £250,000, the arbitrators' fees are set at £95 per hour; and (3) in
excess of £250,001, the arbitrators' fees are set at £120 per hour. Id.
21.
REDFERN &. HUNTER, supra note 7, at 24 1.
22.
Charges for Fees and Recovery of Expenses of Arbitrator in South
Africa (Mar. 2000) (on file with author).
23.
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 241 n.73; Engagement Letter of
Arbitrator in the United States (Apr. 2000) (on file with author) (stating that the
arbitrator charges $2,750 for hearing and travel days and $325 per hour for other
work).
See also Margaret Wang, Are Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods
Superior to Litigation in Resolving Disputes in InternationalCommerce, 16 ARB. INT'L
189, 196 n.17 (2000) (stating that "[iun Australia, arbitrator's fees vary from
AU$100 to AU$400 per hour").
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countries, such as Germany and Austria, arbitrators' rates are
24
usually based on the statutory attorneys' fee-scale.

3. The Fixed Fee Method
Under the fixed fee method, the compensation due to the
arbitrators is set at a certain amount. This amount covers all
work performed by the arbitrators in connection with the matter,
including hearing days and time spent on travel for hearings. The
advantage of this method is that the parties know their costexposure at the outset of the arbitration. Its disadvantage is that
the remuneration may not necessarily correspond to the amount
25
of time spent in connection with the arbitration.

The fixed fee method is less commonly used than the other

two approaches and, where it has been employed, the cases tend
to be of major importance and involve arbitrators of high
international standing. 26 Perhaps one of the reasons why it has
not been regularly employed is that fixing the amount of the
arbitrators' fees at the outset tends to be a difficult task. Alan
Redfern and Martin Hunter explain:
[I]t is difficult to know how the case will develop; whether or not it
will settle before it reaches a hearing; and if it does not settle, how
long the hearing itself is likely to take. The best that can be done,
in such circumstances, is to make an intelligent assessment of the
total number of days likely to be spent by the arbitrators on the
case, assuming that it runs its full course, and then to multiply
this total by an appropriate daily rate, so as to arrive at a figure for
27
the fixed fee.

24.
Letter from Arbitrator in Germany to John Y. Gotanda (Apr. 2000) (on
file with author); Letter from Arbitrator in Austria to John Y. Gotanda (May 2000)
(on file with author).
See generally Virginia G. Maurer et al., Attorney Fee
Arrangements: The U.S. and Western European Perspectives, 19 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 272, 321 (1999) (discussing attorney fee arrangements in European civil law
countries).
25.
With regard to fixed-fees, an arbitrator in Australia explained:
This appears to be attractive to commercial disputants in that they know
with a degree of certainty the costs of the arbitral tribunal. This also
means that I bear some of the risk in that my time estimates to conduct
the matter may be insufficient but it also provides a strong incentive to
drive matters on in a cost efficient manner.
In cases where I have agreed to a lump sum fee then that fee is ordinarily
payable whether or not the arbitration proceeds to conclusion by award.
Letter from Arbitrator in Australia to John Y. Gotanda (Apr. 2000) (on file with
author).
26.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 241. But cf. Letter from
Arbitrator in Australia to John Y. Gotanda (Apr. 2000) (on file with author) (stating
that the respondent from Australia was "more and more accepting appointments
as an arbitrator on a lump sum fee basis").
27.
REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 7, at 242.
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B. Securing Payment, Cancellationand Commitment Fees
It is customary in both institutional and ad hoc arbitrations
for parties to pay, in advance, a sum of money as security for the
28
This
payment of the fees and expenses of the arbitral tribunal.
deposit is to be applied against future fees and costs incurred
If the proceedings are
during the course of proceedings.
prematurely terminated (because, for example, the parties settle
their dispute), traditionally the arbitrators refund any unearned
It also has become common practice for some
monies. 29
arbitrators to require the parties to pay a certain amount if they
book the arbitrators' time, but do not ultimately use it. These
fees are commonly called cancellation or commitment fees.
1. Cancellation Fees
A cancellation fee is an amount that the parties agree to pay
if a previously scheduled hearing is canceled or continued. The
rationale for imposing such a fee is that the arbitrator must set
aside particular days for the hearings, and, in the event of a lastminute cancellation or continuance, the arbitrator will be unable
to schedule another income-producing activity in substitution for
that period.3 0

28.
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 95 (1994); Schwartz, supranote 10, at 17. See also AM. ARBITRATION ASs'N,
supra note 20, art. 33 (Deposit of Costs); INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note
9, art. 30 (Advance to Cover the Costs of the Arbitration); LONDON COURT OF INT'L
ARBITRATION, supra note 18, art. 24 (Deposits); UNITED NATIONS, COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, ARBITRATION RULES art. 41, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/IX/CRP. 1,
amended by A/CN.9/SR.176, A/CN.9/SR.177 (1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701
(1976) (Deposit of Costs) [hereinafter UNCITRAL].
This is generally true even when the institution uses an ad valorem
29.
method to compensate the tribunal. Commentators state that, to avoid a windfall
to the arbitrators if the case settles early, the overseeing institution should deviate
from its fee schedule. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 11, at 40-4 1; Schwartz, supra note
10, at 11 n. 17. In fact, a number of survey respondents noted that where the
parties settled early, the arbitrators were not adequately compensated for the work
performed by the arbitral institution. A fixed fee arrangement also may result in
However,
the arbitrators' receiving a windfall if the case settles early.
commentators write that the arbitrators usually are not entitled to the full amount
in such circumstances "[sjince the fee must be taken to contemplate that the
remuneration includes an element attributable to the reaching of a decision and
the preparation of an award. . . ." MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C. BOYD, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 243 (2d ed. 1989).
Interestingly, one respondent opined that fixed fees are rarely used, and he could
recall only two cases involving such an arrangement, one of which "turned out
quite badly for the tribunal because the case involved much more work than
expected." Letter from Arbitrator in England to John Y. Gotanda (Apr. 2000) (on
file with author).
30.
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 239.
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The amount of the cancellation fee varies depending on the
arbitrators' practice, the number of days reserved for the hearing,
and the date when the arbitrator is notified that the hearing is
canceled or postponed. The AAA states that if a cancellation fee

31
is charged, it is generally one-half of the arbitrator's daily rate.
Where consecutive days of a hearing are postponed, the AAA
encourages arbitrators to charge for the cancellation of only one

day.

32

The following are examples of cancellation clauses used by
arbitrators in ad hoc arbitrations. The first is from an arbitrator
in the United States and the second is from an arbitrator in New
Zealand:
Sample Clause 1: Cancellations or continuance of hearings less
than thirty (30) days notice but more than seven (7) days prior to
their having been scheduled will result in a fee of fifty percent (50%)
of the time reserved by me, and if canceled within seven (7) days
before such hearing, a fee of seventy-five percent (75%) of the time
thus reserved to compensate for such time in which other work was
33
not scheduled.
Sample Clause 2: In the event of cancellation or postponement
less than 4 weeks before the start of the hearing, [a cancellation fee
will result amounting to] 50% of the Tribunal's daily sitting rate
multiplied by the number of days reserved and in the event of
cancellation or postponement more than 4 weeks but less than 12
weeks before the start of the hearing, [a cancellation fee will result
amounting to] 30% of the Tribunal's daily sitting rate multiplied by
34
the number of days reserved.

2. Commitment Fees
In general, a commitment fee, also known as a booking fee, is
an amount paid by the parties to the arbitral tribunal when the
If the hearing takes place, the fee is
hearing dates are set.
credited against the amount owed to the tribunal. If the hearing
Like
does not take place, the tribunal keeps the fee.3 5

31.
AM. ARBITRATION ASSN, FACT SHEET: ARBITRATOR FEES AND EXPENSES IN
INTERNATIONAL CASES (1999), available at http://www.adr.org/rules/guides/
990819aa.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2000).
32.
Id.
33.
Engagement Letter of Arbitrator in the United States to John Y.
Gotanda (Apr. 2000) (on file with author).
34.
Attachment to Letter from Arbitrator in New Zealand to John Y.
Gotanda (May 2000) (on file with author).
35.
A commitment fee also may be defined more broadly to mean a fee paid
to the tribunal at the outset so that "even if the arbitration does not take place [it]
...provide[s] some recompense in case [the arbitrator] is unable to obtain other
equally remunerative work in the time set aside for the arbitration." K/S Norjarl
A/S v. Hyundai Heavy Indus. Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 524, 535 (C.A. 1990) (StuartSmith, L.J.), appeal dismissed, [1992] Q.B. 863. However, it is more commonly
used in connection with the booking of hearing days, rather than as a fee simply
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fee is to compensate the
cancellation fees, the commitment
3 6
arbitrators for lost employment.
The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Chartered Institute)
advises arbitrators that they may wish to "protect themselves
against the consequences of hearings or meetings being cancelled
at relatively short notice" by charging "a non-returnable booking
fee at a proportion of the full daily rate for the time set aside to be
paid at the time the hearing is firmly fixed."3 7 However, the Court
of Appeal in England has stated that "if arbitrators wish to insist
on the payment of a commitment fee, the proper time to do so is
before appointment" and that once they accept appointment, "no
term can be implied that entitles... [them] to a commitment fee,
and the arbitration agreement cannot be varied in that way
without the consent of all parties."3 8 In addition, if the agreement
between the arbitrators and the parties is silent on the payment
of a commitment fee, it would constitute misconduct for the
payment of such fee as a condition to
arbitrators to insist on the
39
performing their services.
At least one arbitral institution's rules explicitly provides for
the payment of a commitment fee. According to the Terms of the
London Maritime Arbitrators Association:
(a)

For a hearing of up to ten days' duration there shall be
payable to the tribunal a booking fee of £250 per person or
such other sum as the Committee of the Association may
from time to time decide, for each day reserved. The

to ensure the arbitrators' availability for the duration of the arbitration. E.g., K/S
Norjarl, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 526-33.
In K/S Norjarl, Lord Justice Leggatt explained why a commitment fee
36.
was preferable to paying the arbitrators only for their actual damages in the event
that the parties reserved hearing days but settled their dispute before the hearing:
I regard as impracticable .

.

. [the] suggestion that .

.

. clients might be

prepared to reimburse the arbitrators for such actual loss as could be
shown to have been incurred by reason of settlement before the end of the
period reserved. Arbitrators cannot reasonably be invited to agree to such
an amorphous arrangement. It would in any event provide a fruitful
source of discord, which might involve proof of the amount of the
arbitrators' actual earnings during the relevant period as well as the
reasons why they had not availed themselves of particular opportunities of
work.
Id. at 533.
CHARTERED INST. OF ARBITRATORS, GUIDELINES FOR ARBITRATORS AS TO
37.
HOW TO FORMULATE THEIR TERMS OF REMUNERATION: MATTERS TO BE COVERED § 2

(2000). The Chartered Institute is a professional body with over 9000 members in
84 countries whose object is "to promote and facilitate the determination of
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Services, at
disputes by arbitration."
http://www.arbitrators.org/Services/services.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2000).
K/S Norjarl, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 531.
38.
39.
Id.
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booking fee will be invoiced to the party asking for the
hearing date to be fixed or to the parties in equal shares if
both parties ask for the hearing date to be fixed as the case
may be ....
For hearings over ten days duration the booking fee in
[paragraph (a)] above shall for each day reserved be
increased by 30% in the case of a hearing of up to 15 days
and 60% in the case of a hearing up to 20 days and may, at
the discretion of the tribunal, be subscribed in nonreturnable instalment payments. For hearings in excess of
20 days the booking fee shall be at the rate for a hearing of
20 days plus such additional sum as may be agreed with
the parties in the light of the length of the proposed hearing.
Where the case proceeds to an award, or is settled
subsequent to the start of the hearing, appropriate credit
will be given for the booking fee in calculating the amount to
be paid in order to collect the award, or as the case may be,
the amount payable to the tribunal upon settlement of the
case.
Where, at the request of one or both parties, a hearing is
adjourned or a hearing date vacated prior to or on or after
the start date, then, unless non-returnable instalment or
other payments have been agreed, the booking fee will be
retained by the tribunal (i) in full if the date is adjourned or
vacated less than three months before the start date or on
or after that date, (ii) as to 50 per cent if the date is
adjourned or vacated three months or more before the start
date....
Where, at the request of one or both of the parties, a
hearing is adjourned or a hearing date is vacated and a new
hearing date is fixed, a further booking fee will be payable in
40
accordance with paragraphs (a)and (b) above.

While these rules provide an example of an explicit provision
for the payment of a commitment fee, charging such fees often
remains at the arbitrators' discretion, as seen in the results of the
survey discussed below.

III.

THE SURVEY

A. The Scope of the Survey
In March 2000, questionnaires were sent to 877 individuals
in 72 countries who practice in the area of international
arbitration, either as attorneys or arbitrators, or both. 4 1 The
questionnaires asked five questions:

40.
LONDON MARITIME ARBITRATORS ASS'N, LMAA TERMS: FIRST SCHEDULE
§§ B(1)(a)-(e) (1997), available at http://www.lmaa.org.uk/default.html (last
visited Sept. 25, 2000).
41.
The survey participants were drawn from the members of a prominent
international arbitral organization.
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1.
2.

3.
4.

5

In what country do you practice?
When serving as an arbitrator, how do you calculate your
fees? (The survey specifically asked whether the respondent,
when serving as an arbitrator, calculated his or her fees
based on (a) a fixed fee, (b) the amount of worked performed,
(3) a percentage of the amount in dispute, or (d) some other
method.)
42
Do you charge cancellation or commitment fees?
How do you calculate any refund due to the parties? (The
survey specifically asked whether the respondent (a)
refunded to the parties all unearned fees, (b) refunded all
unearned fees if settlement occurred at least one month
before the scheduled arbitration hearing, or (c) refunded the
unearned fees to the extent that the time that would have
been spent preparing for the arbitration could be used for
other matters.)
What is your reason for not charging cancellation or
commitment fees? (The survey specifically asked whether (a)
the practice was prohibited by local law, (b) the practice was
prohibited by ethical rules, or (c) there was some other
reason for not charging cancellation or commitment fees.)

Because mail surveys often do not lend themselves to extensive
probing of the complexities of the subject matter, the
questionnaire contained adequate space for the respondents to
provide additional comments or other information.
In order to encourage responses, complete anonymity was
promised. 43 In addition, included with the questionnaires were
44
self-addressed envelopes to return the survey.
B. The Survey Results
1. The Respondents
A total of 262 individuals completed and returned the
questionnaire. This amounts to a thirty percent response rate,
4S
which is statistically very good for this type of survey.

42.
The survey used the term "non-refundable fees" to mean cancellation
or commitment fees. The respondents understood "non-refundable fees" as being

equivalent to cancellation or commitment fees.
43.
To further encourage responses, respondents were also offered the
results of the survey. If the respondents wished to receive a copy of the survey,
they were asked to write their current address on the back of the return envelope.
Upon receipt, the envelopes were separated from the completed surveys to
preserve anonymity. It should be noted that a number of respondents included
with the questionnaire signed letters explaining their positions on the issues
raised by the survey.
44.
A number of respondents faxed or e-mailed their responses.
45.
THOMAS W. MANGIONE, MAIL SURVEYS: IMPROVING THE QUALITY 62 (1995)
("[I1t would be common to see response rates [for mall surveys] in the 20% range,
and it would not be surprising to see them in the 5% range."); Jon A. Krosnick,
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Table 1: Regional Breakdown of Respondents
% as Compared
to All
Respondents

Region
Europe
Common Law Countries (U.K.)
Civil Law Countries
North America
Canada
United States
Middle East
Africa
Oceania
Asia
Other
Total

25%
29%
5%
20%
3%
7%
5%
4%
2%
100%

2. Method for Calculating Arbitrators' Fees
Over two-thirds of the respondents indicated that, when
serving as an arbitrator, they calculate their fees based on the
amount of work performed. The remaining respondents were
nearly equally divided over whether they calculate their
remuneration based on a fixed fee, based on a percentage of the
amount in dispute, or based on some other method.
Table 2: Basis for Calculating Arbitrators' Fees

Method
Based on the Amount of Work
Performed
Based on a Fixed Fee
Based on a Percentage
of the Amount in Dispute
Other

% as Compared
to All
Respondents 4 6
66%
10%
10%
12%

Survey Research, 50 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 537, 540 (1999) (stating that mail
surveys of the outcome of state elections in Ohio over a fifteen year period had
response rates of approximately twenty percent).
46.
Two percent of the respondents did not answer this question.
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It should be noted that a significant number of respondents
(27%) indicated that they use more than one method to calculate
their fees as an arbitrator. Many stated that when serving as an
arbitrator in an arbitration administered under the auspices of an
institution, they based their fees on the amount in dispute, but
when serving as an arbitrator in an ad hoc arbitration, they based
their fees on the amount of work performed.
3. Cancellation or Commitment Fees
The survey found that almost one-third of the respondents
charge cancellation or commitment fees. The majority of those
that do so practice in the United Kingdom.
Table 3: Regional Breakdown of Respondents Charging
Cancellation or Commitment Fees

Region
Europe
Common Law
Countries
Civil Law
Countries
North America
Canada
United States
Middle East
Africa
Oceania
Asia
Total

% as
Compared to
Respondents
from Region

% as Compared
to All
Respondents

61%

15%

14%

4%

39%
18%
38%
26%
50%
27%

2%
3%
1%
2%
2%
1%
30%

Many respondents provided reasons for charging cancellation
or commitment fees. One United States arbitrator explained:
Many of my cases require a week or more of hearing time. Often
days of travel also are necessary. Once the time is reserved, it
eliminates those dates for other work as a neutral. Since I often
schedule matters 2 or 3 months in advance, I frequently lose other
cases because of the parties' time constraints. I learned yesterday
that a scheduled matter... will have to be moved. Unfortunately, I
lost two cases because I was not available when contacted. That
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continuance[, which was not covered by the arbitrator's current
47
cancellation policy,] cost me over U.S. $10,000.
A respondent located in Ireland similarly explained why, when
serving as an arbitrator, it is necessary to charge such fees, "In
many cases, one is appointed and nothing happens for a long
time during which you would have refused to take other
appointments. Then, the parties settle and you will [be left] with
48
nothing for the time wasted."
Interestingly, a number of respondents, mainly located in the
United States, indicated that, although they did not currently
charge cancellation or commitment fees, they were considering
doing so in the future. One respondent based in Switzerland
noted that "as arbitrations become more complex, the practice of
arbitrators charging [cancellation or commitment fees] is likely to
spread."4 9 Another respondent in Switzerland wrote:
[M]ost Swiss lawyers , . . charge for time actually spent, taking
into consideration the amounts at stake and the result. It will be I
think considered as improper to charge for time booked and not
used, unless in exceptional circumstances ....
Personally, talking from experience (unfortunately experience of
wasted time not of payment), I think there is very much to be said
in favour of some sort of flat fee to compensate the arbitrator for
time reserved and not used. There are an increasing number of
arbitrations that are settled at a rather early stage, without too
much involvement of the arbitrator, except possibly for a first
meeting with counsel, but which had been taken into consideration
by the arbitrator when organizing his calendar for the next coming
months or years, thus prompting him to refuse other arbitrations in
consideration of the existing ones. This was recently the case for
me with two or three ICC arbitrations that I had accepted, but
which settled after a few months, sometimes a few years of silence,
but were still on the list. Once again, some sort of consideration
sO
should be given for some sort of compensation.
4.

Calculating Any Refunds Due to Parties

Almost half of the respondents indicated that it is their
practice to refund all unearned fees when, for example, a case
settles. A small number of arbitrators indicated that they refund
unearned fees if settlement occurs at least one month before the
scheduled arbitration hearing or if the time that would have been

47.
Letter from Arbitrator in the United States to John Y. Gotanda (2000)
(on file with author).
48.
Letter from Arbitrator in Ireland to John Y. Gotanda (2000) (on file with
author).
49.
Letter from Arbitrator in Switzerland to John Y. Gotanda (2000) (on file
with author).
50.
Letter from Arbitrator in Switzerland to John Y. Gotanda (2000) (on file
with author).
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spent preparing for the arbitration can be used on other feegenerating matters.
Table 4: Basis for Calculating Any Refunds Due to Parties

Method

% as Compared
to All
Respondents 5 '

All Unearned Fees are Refunded

43%

Unearned Fees are Refunded to the
Extent that the Time that Would
Have Been Spent Preparing for the
Arbitration Can Be Used for Other
Matters

16%

All Unearned Fees are Refunded if
Settlement Occurs at Least 1 Month
Before the Scheduled Hearing

8%

5. Reasons for Not Charging Cancellation or Commitment Fees
As noted, the majority of the arbitrators surveyed do not
charge cancellation or commitment fees. The reasons for not
doing so vary. A small number of respondents indicated that
such practice was prohibited by either local law or ethical rules.
Most, however, provided some other rationale.
Several
respondents indicated that they felt it was morally wrong to
charge for work not performed; that is, the charge would result in
a windfall to the arbitrators. Others indicated that it was not
common practice to charge cancellation or commitment fees in
their jurisdictions. A few noted that to charge such fees would
unduly complicate their bookkeeping. One respondent based in
the United States wrote that the "practice [is] universally disliked
by parties and can add considerably to the cost of the
52
arbitration."

51.
One-third of the respondents did not answer this question.
52.
Letter from Arbitrator in the United States to John Y. Gotanda (2000)
(on file with author).
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Table 5: Basis Cited for Not Charging
Cancellation or Commitment Fees

Rationale
Practice Prohibited by Local Law
Practice Prohibited by Ethical Rules
Other Reasons

% as Compared to
All Respondents 5 3
3%
10%
49%

There seems to be much confusion over whether local laws or
ethical rules forbid the practice of charging cancellation or
commitment fees. For example, one respondent from Nigeria
indicated that the fees were prohibited by local law, while others
from that country stated that it was acceptable to charge these
fees. In addition, some respondents from Egypt and Saudi Arabia
wrote that the ethical rules in their countries prohibited
arbitrators from charging cancellation or commitment fees, while
some of their colleagues thought it was appropriate to do so.
Responses from respondents residing in civil law countries in
Europe and from the United States noted similar confusion.
6. Survey Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from the survey. First, the
most commonly used method to determine arbitrators' fees is the
time-based method, except when the arbitral institution
calculates the tribunal's fees based on the ad valorem method.
Second, while most arbitrators do not charge cancellation or
commitment fees, the number of arbitrators that do charge such
fees is substantial (30%). The practice of charging cancellation or
commitment fees is most commonly employed in the United
Kingdom. It also appears to be used regularly in Canada, the
Middle East and Oceania.
Currently, cancellation and
commitment fees are not widely used in the European continent
and the United States. Third, the charging of cancellation or
commitment fees is likely to increase. A number of respondents,
especially in the United States and the European continent,
expressed an inclination to begin charging such fees. In addition,
most jurisdictions do not appear to explicitly prohibit by law or
ethical rules the charging of such fees. The practice of not
charging such fees seems to be based more on personal
preference or regional custom.
Thus, arbitrators in many

53.

Thirty-eight percent of the respondents did not answer this question.
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jurisdictions appear to be free to adopt the practice of charging
such fees if they so desire.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR ARBITRATORS LOCATED IN THE UNITED STATES
HEARING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES

Arbitrators in the United States are especially likely to adopt
the practice of charging cancellation or commitment fees. In
addition to the survey's findings, several factors support this
proposition. First, the rules or practices of the most widely used
arbitral organizations allow for such fees to be charged in
international arbitrations. Second, although it is far from clear, it
appears that most ethical rules and local laws do not prohibit
arbitrators from charging cancellation or commitment fees.
Third, the charging of such fees is not likely to have a significant
adverse impact on the costs of the arbitration or the ability of the
parties to settle their dispute.
A. Arbitral Rules FacilitateCharging Cancellation
and Commitment Fees
The rules of the most widely used arbitral institutions do not
explicitly address whether arbitrators may charge cancellation or
commitment fees. 5 4
However, the provisions of these rules
addressing arbitrator compensation are, in most instances, broad
enough to allow for the inclusion of such fees. Moreover, several
institutions' guidelines for compensating arbitrators expressly
allow for such fees.
The international arbitration rules of the AAA, the largest
arbitral body in the United States, simply state that "[a]rbitrators
shall be compensated based upon their amount of service, taking
into account their stated rate of compensation and the size and
complexity of the case."5
The issue of cancellation and
commitment fees, however, is addressed in the AAA's guide to
arbitrators' fees and expenses. It provides:
[A]rbitrators may charge cancellation fees, provided same are
indicated on their resume. An arbitrator's cancellation fee is
generally one-half of his or her daily rate. Where consecutive days

54.
INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, art. 31; AM. ARBITRATION
ASS'N, supra note 20, art. 32; LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARBITRATION, supra note 18,
art. 28.
55.
AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 20, art. 32.
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of hearing are postponed, arbitrators are encouraged to charge for
56
the cancellation of only one day.

Similarly, the LCIA Rules do not expressly address the
payment of cancellation or commitment fees, but these fees are
acknowledged in other guidelines. Article 28 of the LCIA Rules,
which concerns the fees of the tribunal, states that the
arbitrators' fees "shall be determined by the LCIA Court in
accordance with the [LCIA] Schedule of Costs."5 7
The LCIA
schedule of costs provides that "[t]he Tribunal's fees may also
include a charge for time reserved but not used as a result of late
postponement or cancellation, provided that the basis for such
charge shall be advised in writing to, and approved by, the LCIA
Court."5 8

The ad hoc arbitration rules set forth by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) also do not
explicitly provide for or prohibit the payment of cancellation or
commitment fees.5 9 With respect to the remuneration of the
tribunal, the UNCITRAL Rules provide that the arbitrators' fees
"shall be reasonable in amount, taking into account the amount
in dispute, the complexity of the subject-matter, the time spent
by the arbitrators, and any other relevant circumstances of the
case." 60
This language is sufficiently broad to allow for the
payment of cancellation or commitment fees. 6 1

56.

AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 31 (answer to Question 7).

57.
58.

LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARBITRATION, supranote 18, art. 28. 1.
LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARBITRATION, supra note 19, art. 4(c).

Like the

AAA and LCIA, the ICC Rules are broad enough to allow for the payment of
cancellation or commitment fees. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, art.
31(2) ("The Court may fix the fees of the arbitrators at a figure higher or lower than
that which would result from the application of the relevant scale .. . due to the
exceptional circumstances of the case."). But unlike the AAA and LCIA, the Internal
Rules of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC do not explicitly address
the payment of cancellation or commitment fees. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
ARBITRATION COSTS AND FEES, app. III, art. 2(6) (Jan. 1998), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp#article_2_2 (last visited
Sept. 25, 2000). They appear to be sufficiently comprehensive, however, to allow for
the payment of cancellation fees: "[i]f an arbitration terminates before the rendering
of a final Award, the Court shall fix the costs of the arbitration at its discretion,
taldng into account the stage attained by the arbitral proceedings and any other
relevant circumstances." Id. It should be noted that survey respondents indicated
that the ICC generally does not take the cancellation of a hearing into account in
setting the arbitrators' fees in the event that the arbitration settles early.
59.
UNCITRAL, supra note 28, art. 39.
60.
Id. Article 39 of the UNCITRAL Rules further provides:
2. If an appointing authority has been agreed upon by the parties or
designated by the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
at The Hague, and if that authority has issued a schedule of fees for
arbitrators in international cases which it administers, the arbitral
tribunal in fixing fees shall take that schedule of fees into account to the
extent that it considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
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In short, the most widely used arbitral rules should not be a
barrier to arbitrators to charging cancellation or commitment
fees. Moreover, the largest arbitral body in the United States, the
AAA, expressly allows for the payment of these fees. These
factors are likely to facilitate their increased use by arbitrators in
the United States.
B. Ethical Rules and Cancellationand Commitment Fees
A number of survey respondents were uncertain whether
cancellation or commitment fees were prohibited by applicable
ethical rules governing the conduct of lawyers.
Some
respondents believed that attorney ethics rules applied to lawyers
serving as arbitrators, meaning that the provisions in those rules
governing attorneys' fees would preclude the charging of
cancellation or commitment fees. Others disagreed. This result
is not surprising; jurisdictions and commentators are divided over
whether attorney ethics rules apply to lawyers serving as
arbitrators. Even if such rules do apply, however, it appears that
they would not per se prohibit lawyers serving as arbitrators from
charging cancellation or commitment fees.
1. Applicability of Ethical Rules Governing the Conduct of
Lawyers Who Serve as Arbitrators
In the United States, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have adopted some form of regulation for lawyers.
Most of these regulations are based on the American Bar

3. If such appointing authority has not issued a schedule of fees for
arbitrators in international cases, any party may at any time request the
appointing authority to furnish a statement setting forth the basis for
establishing fees which is customarily followed in international cases in
which the authority appoints arbitrators.
If the appointing authority
consents to provide such a statement, the arbitral tribunal in fixing its fees
shall take such information into account to the extent it considers
appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
4. In cases referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3, when a party so
requests and the appointing authority consents to perform the function,
the arbitral tribunal shall fix its fees only after consultations with the
appointing authority which may make any comment it deems appropriate
to the arbitrators concerning fees.

Id.
61.
In cases in which the UNCITRAL Rules are used with the AAA acting as
the appointing authority and administrator, presumably the AAA would follow its
general practice and allow the arbitrators to charge a cancellation fee. See supra
text accompanying notes 31-32.

802

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:779

Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 62 Federal
courts also have adopted rules regulating the conduct of lawyers
practicing before those courts. These rules often incorporate the
63
attorney ethics code of the state in which the federal court sits.
The Model Rules do not explicitly address whether their
provisions apply to attorneys serving as arbitrators. There are
two provisions, however, that may be relevant to the issue: Model
Rules 2.2 and 5.7.64
Model Rule 2.2 sets forth guidelines under which a lawyer
may act as an intermediary between clients. 65 While Rule 2.2 is

62.
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, 56-58 (1986); Maureen E.
Laflin, Preserving the Integrity of Mediation Through the Adoption of Ethical Rules
for Lawyer-Mediators, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL' 479, 499 (2000).
In 1970, the ABA promulgated the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
"Within a few years, every state had adopted the new Code in some form," the
most notable exception being California.
STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON,
Introduction to REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS at xiii, xxiv
(2000). In 1983, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Id. To date, "more than 40 states and the District of
Columbia [have] adopted all or significant portions of the Model Rules, and several
others [are] in the process of doing so." Id. The states that have not adopted the
Model Rules include, among others, California, New York, Oregon, and Vermont.
Id. at xxv. It should be noted, however, that New York has amended its attorney
ethics code to include many provisions of the Model Rules. Id. California
similarly has amended its Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. Also, effective March
18, 1999, California added Rule 1-7 10 to its Rules of Professional Conduct, which
gives the state bar the authority to discipline California lawyers who violate
California's Code of Judicial Ethics while serving as temporary judges, referees, or
court-appointed arbitrators. CAL. R. CT. 1-710.
63.
WOLFRAM, supranote 62, at 58.
64.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (1999), reprinted in STEPHEN
GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 190
(2000); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7, reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS &
ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 326-27 (2000).
65.
Model Rule 2.2 states:
(a) A lawyer may act as an intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of
the common representation, including the advantages and risks involved,
and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client's
consent to the common representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on
terms compatible with the client's best interests, that each client will be
able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is
little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the
contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation
can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other
responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client
concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in
making them, so that each client can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so
requests, or if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer
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silent on whether it applies to a lawyer acting
as an arbitrator,
66
the comment explicitly states that it does not.
The ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct (Ethics Commission 2000), which was
established to undertake a comprehensive study and evaluation
of the Model Rules, has recommended that Model Rule 2.2 be
deleted in its entirety. 6 7 The Commission believes that Model
Rule 2.2 is deficient because it implies that a lawyer representing
multiple clients as an intermediary is not fully subject to the
conflicts of interest rules, particularly Model Rule 1.7.68 The
Commission has proposed that the ABA revise the rules and
comments to address the conflicts of interest that lawyers face

satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any
of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2, reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D.
SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 190 (2000).
66.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. 2, reprinted in STEPHEN
GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 191
(2000). The comment provides:
The Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting as an arbitrator or
mediator between or among parties who are not clients of the lawyers, even
where the lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of the parties.
In performing such a role the lawyer may be subject to applicable codes of
ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes
prepared by a joint Committee of the American Bar Association and the
American Arbitration Association.
Id. Cf. Mass. Bar Ass'n Op. 85-3 (1985), reprinted in AM. BAR ASS'N & BUREAU OF
NAT'L AFFAIRS, ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 53 (1986)
(setting forth the ethical guidelines under which a lawyer may act as a mediator
between divorcing spouses); Or. State Bar Ethics Op. 488 (1983), reprinted in AM.
BAR ASS'N & BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 62 (1984) (setting forth the ethical guidelines under which
a lawyer may act as a mediator between divorcing spouses). See also Leonard L.
Riskin, Toward New Standardsfor the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARiz. L.
REV. 329, 334 (1984) (discussing private divorce mediation); Glen Sato, Note, The
Mediator-Lawyer: Implications for the Practice of Law and One Argument for
ProfessionalResponsibility Guidance-A Proposalfor Some Ethical Considerations,
34 UCLA L. REV. 507, 519 (1986) (noting other bar association opinions
recognizing the mediation role of the lawyer); Alison Smiley, Note, Professional
Codes and
Neutral Lawyering: An
Emerging Standard Governing
NonrepresentationalAttorney Mediation, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 213, 223 (1993)
(discussing state ethics opinions that interpret Model Rule 2.2).
67.
Center for Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Commission on the
Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (May 24, 2000), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2000). See also
Margaret Colgate Love, Update on Ethics 2000 Project and Summary of
Recommendations to Date, SYLLABUS, Winter 2000, at 19, 21 (noting the
recommendation that Model Rule 2.2 be deleted).
68.
Love, supranote 67, at 21.
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when undertaking joint representations.6 9 It also has proposed a
new rule on lawyers serving as third party neutrals, which
requires attorneys serving as neutrals to make clear to the parties
the nature of their role as arbitrators or mediators. 7 0 It does not,
however, attempt to apply all the attorney ethics rules to lawyers
serving as third party neutrals. 7 1 The Commission intends to
submit its proposed recommendations to the ABA House of
Delegates for adoption in the fall of 2000, and debate in that body
is expected to begin in the summer of 2001.72
Model Rule 5.7 addresses the conditions under which a
lawyer may provide law-related services. 7 3
It states that an
attorney is subject to the Model Rules if the law-related services
are provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the
lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or
(2) by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with
others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that
a person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services
of the separate entity are not legal services and that the protections
of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.7 4

Model Rule 5.7 defines law-related services as "service[s] that
might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in
substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that
are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided
by a nonlawyer." 75
The comment to this rule states that
"feixamples of law-related services include providing title
insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real
estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social
work, psychological counseling, tax return preparation, and
patent, medical or environmental counseling." 76 Arbitration is
not included on the list, but this list appears to be illustrative as

69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 21, 23.
71.
Id. at 23 (noting that the "Commission decided after consultation with
various ADR groups not to attempt further to regulate lawyers who serve as third
party neutrals...").
72.
Id. at 19.
73.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7, reprintedin STEPHEN GILLERS &
ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 326-27 (2000).

Model Rule 5.7 was not part of the original version of the Model Rules. The ABA
first adopted Rule 5.7 in 1991 but repealed it a year later. Id. at 329-31. The
current version of the rule was adopted by the ABA in 1994. Id. at 331.
74.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7(a), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS

& ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 326-27 (2000).
75.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7(b), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS
& ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 327 (2000).
76.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 cmt. 8, reprinted in STEPHEN
GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 328-29

(2000).
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opposed to exhaustive. 7 7 Indeed, North Dakota has determined
that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) services are law-related
78
Others that have
services within the meaning of the rule.
and Michigan,
Maine
adopted Model Rule 5.7, such as Indiana,
79
have not yet taken a position on the issue.
Commentators also are divided over whether lawyers serving
as arbitrators, or performing other ADR services, are subject to
attorney ethics rules. Those in favor of applying the attorney
ethics rules to providers of ADR services, such as mediators and
arbitrators, argue that lawyers engaged in such activities are
providing law-related services within the meaning of Model Rule
5.7.80 Others state that the Model Rules are inapplicable to those
providing ADR services, noting that "[a] third party neutral is not
a 'representative' of a party and thus is seemingly taken out of the
s1 They also argue that applying attorney
lawyer rules ....
ethics codes to lawyers who provide ADR services, but not to nonlawyers who provide the same services, 8 2would unfairly set a
higher standard of conduct on the lawyers.

GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 64, at 331-32 (citing Am. Bar Ass'n,
77.
Report of the Special House of Delegates Committee on Ancillary Business in
Support of the 1994 Version of Rule 5.7, at 4 (1994)). See also Andrew M.
Goldner, Note, Minding Someone Else's Businesses: Pennsylvania Rule of
ProfessionalConduct 5.7 Leads the Way, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 767, 772 (1998).
N. D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 cmt. (1997) (stating that law78.
Virginia also has adopted Rules of
related services include ADR services).
Professional Conduct for lawyers that specifically address lawyers acting as third
party neutrals. Virginia's Rules apply to mediators and arbitrators involved in
non-binding arbitrations. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.10-2.11 (1999).
IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1997); ME. CODE OF PROF'L
79.
RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.2(h) (2000); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1998).
Pennsylvania has adopted a version of Model Rule 5.7, which applies to non-legal
services as opposed to law-related services. PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7
(1996). One commentator has argued that this provision is broader than Model
Rule 5.7 and applies to attorneys providing services, such as mediation, in certain
circumstances. Goldner, supra note 77, at 781.
Fiona Furlan et al., Ethical Guidelines for Attorney-Mediators: Are
80.
Attorneys Bound By Ethical Codes for Lawyers When Acting as Mediators? 14 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 267, 293-99 (1997); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., When ADR
is Ancillary to a Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Confront Conflicts Issues, 12
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 147, 147 (1994); Bruce Meyerson, Lawyers Who
Mediate Are Not PracticingLaw, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 74, 75 (1996);
Joseph H. Paulk, So You Want to Be a Mediator? Realistic Considerationsfor
Attorneys ConsideringBecoming Mediators, 35 TULSA L.J. 325, 327-328 (2000).
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New
81.
Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conceptionof Lawyers' Responsibilities,38
S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 422 (1997); Sandra E. Purnell, Comment, The Attorney As
Mediator-InherentConflict Of InterestP,32 UCLA L. REV. 986, 1015 (1985).
Paulk, supra note 80, at 328. A related issue is whether arbitration is
82.
considered the practice of law and, if so, whether that would bar non-lawyers from
serving as arbitrators. Cf. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Mediation the Practice of Law?
Notl, NAT'L INST. DiSP. RESOL. F., June 1997, at 37, 38. Joshua R. Schwartz, Note,
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In view of the above discussion, it remains unsettled whether
This conclusion
attorney ethics rules apply to arbitrators.8 3
supports the survey's finding that arbitrators are unsure of
whether attorney ethics rules govern their conduct.
2. Analysis of Cancellation and Commitment Fees Under the
Attorney Conduct Rules
If lawyers serving as arbitrators are subject to attorney ethics
rules, it must be determined whether any of those rules prohibit
84
A strong
them from charging cancellation or commitment fees.
argument can be made that the ethics rules should permit these
fees.
The relevant provision is Model Rule 1.5. It sets forth the
" s
rule that "[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. " It also provides
factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of the fee.
These factors include, among others:

Laymen Cannot Lawyer, But Is Mediation the Practiceof Law?, 20 CARDozo L. REV.
Some commentators, such as Professor Carrie Menkel1715, 1719 (1999).
Meadow, argue that persons providing ADR services often are engaging in the
practice of law. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes
of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals,44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1915
(1997). Others disagree, contending that there is no representational attorneyclient relationship and no practice of law when individuals serve as third party
neutrals. Meyerson, supranote 80, at 75.
I do not mean to suggest that some specific provisions, such as Model
83.
Rule 8.4, would not apply to a lawyer serving as an arbitrator. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4, reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 423 (2000). Rule 8.4 states that
it would constitute professional misconduct for a lawyer to, among other things,
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 8.4(c), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D.
SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 423 (2000). It also has
been applied to conduct not involving the practice of law. E.g., People v. Bennett,
843 P.2d 1385, 1387 (Colo. 1993) (disciplining lawyer for conveying property with
intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors); People v. Tucker, 837 P.2d 1225,
1229 (Colo. 1992) (stating that the willful failure to pay court-ordered child
support was prejudicial to the administration of justice and adversely reflects on
the fitness to practice law).
In general, if a lawyer is licensed to practice in a jurisdiction, the
84.
governing disciplinary authority of that jurisdiction typically has the authority to
discipline the lawyer for violations of its attorney ethics rules even though the acts
complained of occurred outside the jurisdiction. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 8.5(a), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 444 (2000). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

8.5(b), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 444 (2000) (addressing the choice of law under Rule
8.5(a)).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5, reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS &
85.
ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 48-49 (2000).
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(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
86
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Whether a cancellation or commitment fee is reasonable is likely
to vary from case to case. s 7 The purpose of these fees is to
compensate the arbitrator for lost employment opportunities in
the event that the parties cancel a hearing within a time period
that may not permit the arbitrator to find substitute work.
Because lost employment opportunities may be considered in
setting a lawyer's fee, it appears that cancellation and
commitment fees would not be per se prohibited by Model Rule
1.5.88

Id. The Model Code's counterpart provision is DR 2-106(A), which
86.
states that a lawyer "shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an
illegal or clearly excessive fee." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A)
(1983), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 486 (2000). In addition, DR 2-106(B) provides that a fee
is "clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary
prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess
of a reasonable fee." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B), reprinted
in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 486 (2000). The factors of a reasonable fee contained in DR- 106(B) are
virtually identical to those listed in Model Rule 1.5(a). Compare MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 48-49 (2000) with MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B) (1983), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY
D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 486-87 (2000).
Steven Lubet, The Rush to Remedies: Some Conceptual Questions About
87.
Nonrefundable Retainers, 73 N.C. L. REv. 271, 274 (1994) (stating 'there has
always been a case-by-case rule against charging excessive fees").
It also should be noted that international commercial arbitrations
88.
typically involve sophisticated parties who are represented by experienced counsel
and, in such circumstances, courts may be less willing to find an agreement
providing for the payment of a cancellation or commitment fee unreasonable. Cf.
Ryan v. Butera, Beausang, Cohen & Brennan, 193 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1999)
(quoting McKenzie Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 758 F.2d 97, 101 (3d Cir. 1985), for
fee arrangements
the proposition that "courts should be reluctant to disturb ...
freely entered into by knowledgeable and competent parties"); Brobeck, Phleger &
Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 875 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding a fee
arrangement because the parties were sophisticated, the client desired a certain
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It may also be argued that cancellation and commitment fees
are akin to nonrefundable retainers and that the rules regulating
the
circumstances
under
which
lawyers
may
charge
nonrefundable retainers should apply to cancellation and
commitment fees. To date, there have been no cases in the
United States discussing the applicability of the rules on
nonrefundable retainers to cancellation or commitment fees in
international arbitrations. It appears, however, that the rules on
nonrefundable retainers should not apply to arbitrators charging
cancellation or commitment fees.
In general, there are two types of attorney retainers: general
and special. A general retainer is an agreement between a lawyer
and a client under which the client secures for a fee the lawyer's
availability to provide legal services during a fixed time period.8 9
A special retainer, which is also known as a specific retainer, is
an agreement between a lawyer and a client under which the
client pays the lawyer a fee for a particular service. 90 A subset of
the special retainer is the nonrefundable special retainer, which
is "a fee paid to a lawyer by a client in advance of services to be
rendered and denominated by the lawyer as nonrefundable in the
event that the client terminates the relationship, even if the work
has not been done."9 1 Courts have ruled that general retainers
(even though nonrefundable) are valid because the fees are
earned when paid. 9 2 By contrast, jurisdictions are divided over

caliber of attorney, and the client, after negotiations, had proposed the fee
arrangement that it later challenged).
89.
Ryan, 193 F.3d at 216; In re Gray's Run Tech., Inc., 217 B.R. 48, 52-53
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1997); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v.
Apland, 577 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 1998). See also STUART M. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS'
FEES § 1:4 (1973) (General Retainers).
90.
Ryan, 193 F.3d at 216; Levisohn, Lerner, Berger & Langsam v. Medical
Taping Sys., Inc., 20 F.Supp.2d 645, 650-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Wong v. Michael
Kennedy P.C., 853 F.Supp 73, 80-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). See also SPEISER, supra
note 89, § 1:9 (Special Retainers).
91.
Lester Bricknan & Lawrence A. Cunningham, NonrefundableRetainers:
A Response to Critics of the Absolute Ban, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 11, 19 (1995).
92.
CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 1021 note (West 2000) (Federal Law) (stating that
earned-on-receipt retainers are permissible); Ryan, 193 F.3d at 216-17 (upholding
a $1 million nonrefundable general retainer); Iowa Supreme Court Bd., 577 N.W.2d
at 54 (ruling that the attorney is permitted to keep a general retainer regardless of
whether the attorney performed any services for the client in contrast to a special
retainer, which is not earned when paid); In re Scimeca, 962 P.2d 1080, 1091-92
(Kan. 1998) (stating that a general retainer is a fee paid solely to commit the
attorney to represent the client and not as a fee to be earned by future services).
See also Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers
Revisited, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1, 6 (1993) (asserting that general retainers are earned
when paid because the payment is made for the attorney's availability).
It should be noted that English courts consider commitment fees earned when
paid. E.g., K/S Norjarl A/S v. Hyundai Heavy Indus. Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 524, 532
(C.A. 1990) (Leggatt, L.J.). It is unclear whether United States courts would adopt
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the validity of nonrefundable special retainers. Some courts have
held it unethical for lawyers to charge nonrefundable special
retainers because they violate public policy. 93 Other courts and
state ethics committees have upheld the use of these retainers so
94
long as they are reasonable.
The leading decision prohibiting attorneys from charging
nonrefundable special retainers is In re Cooperman.9 s In that
case, lawyer Edward Cooperman's fee agreement provided for his
clients to pay at the outset a nonrefundable special retainer. 9 6 A
disciplinary action was instituted against Cooperman after several
former clients complained to the local grievance committee that
Cooperman had refused to refund any portion of the retainers
collected, even though the clients had discharged Cooperman
97
prior to the completion of the matters for which he was hired.
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that the
nonrefundable special retainer agreements were unethical,
unconscionable and excessive, and the court suspended
Cooperman for two years. 98 On appeal, the New York Court of
Appeals affin-med, ruling that special nonrefundable retainers are

that view. If they do, the charging of commitment fees would be upheld under the
general retainer rules, so long as they are reasonable.
93.
In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1994). See also In re
Nat'l Magazine Publ'g Co., 172 B.R. 237, 240 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); Wong, 853
F.Supp. at 79; Olsen & Brown v. City of Englewood, 889 P.2d 673, 677 (Colo.
1995); AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams, 444 S.E.2d 314, 316 (Ga. 1994); Brickman &
Cunningham, supra note 91, at 18-25; Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 92,
at 23-25.
94.
Degraaf v. Fusco, 660 A.2d 9, 12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); N.J.
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, Nonrefundable
Retainers, Op. 644 (1990), 1990 WL 441610; Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory
Opinion Committee, Op. 136 (1993), 1993 WL 755253; Wisconsin Op. E-93-4:
Nonrefundable Lawyer Fees, [1995 Transfer Volume] Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics &
Prof'l Resp. (Univ. Pub. Am.).
95.
633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1994).
96.
Id. at 1070. The agreement stated in part:
For the MINIMAL FEE and NON-REFUNDABLE amount of Five Thousand
($5,000.00) Dollars, I will act as your counsel ....
This is the minimum
fee no matter how much or how little work I do in this investigatory stage
... and will remain the minimum fee and not refundable even if you decide
prior to my completion of the investigation that you wish to discontinue the
use of my services for any reason whatsoever.

Id.
97.
Id.
The disciplinary proceeding arose out of (1) a $15,000
nonrefundable retainer to represent an individual in a criminal matter, (2) a
$5,000 nonrefundable retainer to represent an individual in connection with a
probate proceeding, and (3) a $10,000 "minimum fee" to represent an individual in
a criminal matter. Id.
98.
Id. at 1071.
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per se unethical. 9 9 The Court of Appeals stated that clients have
an "unqualified right to terminate the attorney-client relationship
at any time," with or without cause, and that nonrefundable
retainers inappropriately compromise the right to sever the
fiduciary relationship because it imposes penalties on the client
for discharging the lawyer.1 0 0 The Court of Appeals explained:
Special nonrefundable retainer fee agreements diminish the core of
the fiduciary relationship by substantially altering and
economically chilling the client's unbridled prerogative to walk away
from the lawyer. To answer that the client can technically still
terminate misses the reality of the economic coercion that pervades
such matters. If special nonrefundable retainers are allowed to
flourish, clients would be relegated to hostage status in an
Such
unwanted fiduciary relationship-an utter anomaly.
circumstance would impose a penalty on a client for daring to
10 1
invoke a hollow right to discharge.
The Court of Appeals thus held that nonrefundable special
retainers violate public policy and that it is ethically improper for
0 2
attorneys to use them.
Unlike the New York Court of Appeals, the New Jersey
Superior Court, Appellate Division has stated that nonrefundable
retainers are not per se unethical.103 The court ruled that such
retainers are "subject to the overriding precept that any fee
arrangement must be reasonable." 10 4 The court noted, however,
that the "unused portion of even a nonrefundable retainer should
be returned if the contravening events should render it
unconscionable for the attorney to keep it." 1 0 5
Cancellation and commitment fees arguably are similar to
nonrefundable special retainers in that they are paid to the
arbitrators so that they will be available for a specific service;

99.
Id. at 1071-74.
100. Id. at 1072.
101. Id. at 1072-73.
102. Id. at 1074. The Court of Appeals stated that its ruling did not apply to
"[m]inimum fee arrangements and general retainers that provide for fees, not
laden with the nonrefundability impediment irrespective of any services...." Id.
103. DeGraaf v. Fusco, 660 A.2d 9, 12 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1995).
There, plaintiff agreed to pay an attorney a $15,000 retainer to represent her son
in a criminal matter. Id. at 10. Plaintiffs son was never charged with any offense
and plaintiff subsequently sought the return of all or part of the retainer. Id. at
11. When the attorney refused to refund any portion of the retainer, plaintiff
instituted a suit to recover the fee. Id. The lower court entered judgment on a
jury verdict of no cause of action. Id. The Superior Court, Appellate Division
reversed, holding that the lower court made various errors in instructing the jury,
including shifting the burden of proving that the amount charged was
unreasonable to the plaintiff. Id. at 12.
104. Id. at 12.
105. Id.
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namely the arbitration hearing. 10 6 Nevertheless, the prohibition
on nonrefundable special retainers should not apply to
The prohibition on
cancellation and commitment fees.
nonrefundable special retainers is based on the principle that
these retainers violate public policy because they compromise the
client's "unqualified right" to terminate the attorney-client
relationship.1 0 7 In international arbitrations, however, there is no
attorney-client relationship between the arbitrator and the parties
who employ them. Indeed, it is "a fundamental principle in
mainstream international commercial arbitration that an
arbitrator must be and remain impartial and independent." 10 8
Because arbitrators are not fiduciaries of clients in the same
manner as the lawyers who are employed by clients to represent
them, the policy behind the rule banning nonrefundable special
retainers would not be served by applying it to prohibit
10 9
arbitrators from charging cancellation or commitment fees.
3. Ethics Codes for Arbitrators
Many ethics codes drafted specifically to cover arbitrators
offer little guidance on the propriety of cancellation and
commitment fees. None of the codes forbid them. At least one

106.
See Levisohn, Lerner, Berger & Langsam v. Medical Taping Sys., Inc.,
20 F.Supp.2d 645, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Cancellation and commitment fees also
could be seen as a hybrid of the general and special retainer. Although such fees
are for a specific service, i.e. the arbitration hearing, cancellation and commitment
fees are paid for the arbitrator to be available generally on the hearing dates.
Some courts and commentators have stated that hybrid retainers are governed by
the special retainer rules. Id. at 653-54; Brickman & Cunningham, supra note
91, at 23.
See also
107. In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1994).
Brickman & Cunningham, supranote 91, at 13.
108.
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 210.
Cf. Lubet, supra note 87, at 288-90 (claiming that the nonrefundable
109.
retainer rule should not apply to ethics experts because (1) there is no fiduciary
relationship between the expert and the parties who hire them; (2) the experts are
unbiased; and (3) there is no possibility of overreaching because the client, who
has separate independent counsel, does not rely on the arbitrator for legal advice).
It also might be argued that cancellation or commitment fees may in theory
adversely impact the parties' ability to settle the dispute and, thus, they should be
prohibited from a public policy standpoint much like the prohibition against
nonrefundable special retainers. However, as explained more fully in Part IV.E,
infra, cancellation and commitment fees are in reality likely to have little effect on
the parties' ability to settle the dispute. In addition, even when the parties reach, a
settlement and thus cancel the hearing, the arbitrators' duties may not
automatically be terminated. "In many cases.., the parties will find it desirable
or convenient for the terms of the settlement to be embodied in an award."
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 384.
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prominent code expressly permits cancellation fees and one set of
guidelines indirectly permits them.
In the United States, there are very few state ethics codes for
arbitrators." 0
Furthermore, those that have been adopted
typically apply to court-appointed arbitrators."' A number of
private organizations, such as the American Bar Association
(ABA) and the International Bar Association (IBA), have drafted
codes of ethics for use in private arbitrations or as model codes
that may be adopted by states. These codes either allow for the
payment of cancellation or commitment fees or are otherwise
silent on the payment of these fees.
In 1977, a joint committee of the ABA and the AAA prepared
a Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes.'1 2 This
code applies to all AAA arbitrators involved in commercial
disputes and where "disputes or claims are submitted for decision
to one or more arbitrators appointed in a manner provided by an
agreement of the parties, by applicable arbitration rules, or by
law."" 3 It was revised in 1999, by a special committee consisting
of members from both organizations and CPR Institute for
Dispute Resolution. The 1999 ABA Code of Ethics has not yet
been approved by the ABA House of Delegates or the Board of
Governors of the ABA." 4 It has been adopted, however, by the
AAA.
The 1977 Code of Ethics did not address the payment of
cancellation or commitment fees. The provision on arbitrators'
remuneration stated, among other things, that arbitrators should
reach an agreement with the parties on fees prior to accepting

110.
E.g., FLA. R. CT. §§ 11.010-11.120 (West Supp. 2000); S.C. FAMILY CT.
R. Canon I (Law. Co-op. 1998); N.C. R. CT., Canons of Ethics for Arbitrators (West
2000).
111.
FLA. R. CT. §§ 11.010-11.120; S.C. FAMILY CT. R. Canon I. See also
CAL. CODE JUD. ETHICS Canon 6D (West 2000) (stating that the Code applies to
anyone who is a court-appointed arbitrator); OR. UNIFORM TRIAL CT. R. 13.090(3)
(West 2000) ("Arbitrators will conduct themselves in the manner prescribed by the
Code of Judicial Conduct.").
112.
AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N & AM. BAR ASS'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR
ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1977), reprinted in THOMAS H. OEHMKE,

OEHMKE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION app. A-3 (rev. ed. Supp. 2000) [hereinafter 1977
CODE OF ETHICS].

113.
Id. pmbl., reprinted in THOMAS H. OEHMKE, OEHMKE COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION app. A-3, at 1 (rev. ed. Supp. 2000). It should be noted that the AAA
has promulgated a separate code for labor-management disputes.
AM.
ARBITRATION ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF
LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES (1985), available at http://csep.iit.edu/codes/

coe/aarba-b.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2000).
114.

AM.

ARBITRATION

ASS'N

&

AM.

BAR

ASS'N,

CODE

OF

ETHICS

FOR

ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Rev. 1999), available at http://www.
abanet.org/ftp/pub/dispute/arbdoc.txt (last visited Sept. 25, 2000) [hereinafter
1999 CODE OF ETHICS].
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This provision was revised in 1999 to
appointment."l 5
specifically indicate that cancellation fees may be charged. The
1999 Code of Ethics states in pertinent part that "[ilt is preferable
that, before the arbitrator finally accepts appointment, the terms
and conditions of payment, including cancellation fees and
established and
compensation for study and preparation time, 1be
16
writing."
in
thereof
informed
be
that all parties

1977 CODE OF ETHICS, Canon VI(D), reprinted in THOMAS H. OEHMKE,
115.
OEHMKE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION app. A-3 at 7-8 (rev. ed. Supp. 2000). Cannon
VI(D) states:
In many types of arbitration it is customary practice for the
arbitrators to serve without pay. However, in some types of cases it is
customary for arbitrators to receive compensation for their services and
reimbursement for their expenses. In cases in which any such payments
are to be made, all persons who are requested to serve, or who are serving
as arbitrators, should be governed by the same high standards of integrity
and fairness as apply to their other activities in the case. Accordingly,
such persons should scrupulously avoid bargaining with parties over the
amount of payments or engaging in any communications concerning
payments which would create an appearance of coercion or other
impropriety. In the absence of governing provisions in the agreement of
the parties or in rules agreed to by the parties or in applicable law, certain
practices, relating to payments[,] are generally recognized as being
preferable in order to preserve the integrity and fairness of the arbitration
process. These practices include the following:
1.
2.

3.

It is preferable that before the arbitrator finally accepts appointment
the basis of payment be established and that all parties be informed
thereof in writing.
In cases conducted under the rules or administration of an
institution that is available to assist in making arrangements for
payments, the payments should be arranged by the institution to
avoid the necessity for communication by the arbitrators directly with
the parties concerning the subject.
In cases where no institution is available to assist in making
arrangement for payments, it is preferable that any discussions with
arbitrators concerning payments should take place in the presence of
all parties.

Id.
1999 CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 114, Canon VII(1).
116.
provides in its entirety:

Canon VII

VII. AN ARBITRATOR'S ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMPENSATION AND
REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES SHOULD BE FAIR AND CLEARLY
DISCLOSED TO ALL PARTIES.
In some types of arbitration it is customary practice for the arbitrators to
In other cases, however, arbitrators receive
serve without pay.
compensation for their services and reimbursement for their expenses. In
making arrangements for such payments all persons who are requested to
serve or who are serving as arbitrators should be governed by the same
high standards of integrity and fairness as apply to their other activities in
the case. Accordingly, such persons should avoid any communications
concerning the amount of or matters pertaining to such payments which
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The Chartered Institute has promulgated a Code of Ethical
Conduct (Institute's Ethical Code) and Guidelines of Good
Practice for Arbitrators (Institute's Good Practice Guidelines).117
The Institute's Ethical Code sets forth ethical principles to which
their members are required to adhere when conducting
It does not explicitly address the charging of
arbitrations.
cancellation or commitment fees. With respect to the arbitrators'
remuneration, the Institute's Ethical Code provides that the
arbitrators' fees "must be reasonable taking into account all the
circumstances of the case" and the basis of such fees must be
By contrast, the Institute's Good
disclosed to the parties." 8
Practice Guidelines provides advice for arbitrators on being
impartial, independent, competent, diligent and discreet. Unlike
the Institute's Ethical Code, the Good Practice Guidelines
explicitly addresses the payment of cancellation fees. It provides:
11.1 Cancellation charges are intended to compensate the
arbitrator for any loss likely to be suffered as result of time set
aside for a hearing not being required and for the inconvenience
caused by cancellations. In fixing the amount of such charges the
arbitrator should make full allowance for the possibility of
mitigating his loss.

would create an appearance of coercion or other impropriety. In the
absence of governing provisions in the agreement of the parties or in
applicable rules or law, certain practices relating to payments are generally
recognized as being preferable in order to preserve the integrity and
fairness of the arbitration process. These practices include the following.
It is preferable that, before the arbitrator finally accepts appointment,
1.
the terms and conditions of payment, including cancellation fees and
compensation for study and preparation time, be established and
that all parties be informed thereof in writing.
In cases conducted under the rules or administration of an
2.
institution that is available to assist in making arrangements for
payments, the payments should be arranged by the institution to
avoid the necessity for communication by the arbitrators directly with
the parties concerning the subject.
In cases where no institution has been engaged by the parties to
3.
administer the arbitration, it is preferable that any communication
with arbitrators concerning payments take place in writing or in the
presence of all parties.
4.
Absent extraordinary circumstances, the arbitrator should not ask
that his or her rate of compensation be increased during the
pendency of the arbitration.
1999 CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 114, Canon VII.
117. CHARTERED INST. OF ARBITRATORS, CODE
ARBITRATORS (1999).
118. CHARTERED

ARBITRATORS R.5 (1999).

INST. OF ARBITRATORS,

OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR

CODE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT

FOR
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11.2 Provision as to cancellation charges should, if possible, be
agreed with the parties no later than the acceptance of the
1 19
appointment.

The IBA also has promulgated Ethics for International
120
The IBA Ethics Rules are not
Arbitrators (IBA Ethics Rules).
binding on arbitrators or on the parties to an arbitration unless
12 1
With respect to the fees of the
they are adopted by agreement.
tribunal, the IBA Ethics Rules is silent on the payment of
cancellation or commitment fees. It simply states that arbitrators
shall not make any unilateral arrangements for fees and
22
expenses.1
One organization, the Commission on Ethics and Standards
in ADR, has issued a Proposed Model Rule of Professional
Conduct for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral, which is designed
123
to be adopted into the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The proposed rule would apply to a lawyer who acts in a neutral

CHARTERED INST. OF ARBITRATORS, GUIDELINES OF GOOD PRACTICE FOR
119.
ARBITRATORS, paras. 11.1-11.2 (1999). The Chamber of National and International
Arbitration of Milan also has promulgated a set of ethics for arbitrators. CHAMBER
OF NAT'L & INTL ARBITRATION OF MILAN, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS, available
at http://www.camera-arbitrale.com/eng/etic.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2000).
With respect to the fees of the tribunal, the Milan Code of Ethics for Arbitrators
states that "[t]he arbitrator is entitled to reimbursement of expenses and a fee as
exclusively determined by the Chamber of Arbitration according to its Schedule of
Fees, which is deemed to be approved by the arbitrator when accepting his
mandate." Id. para. 11.
INT'L BAR ASS'N, ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS (1987), reprinted
120.
in ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 638 (3d ed. 1999).
INT'L BAR ASSN, ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS para. L-01,
121.
reprinted in ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 638 (3d ed. 1999). If parties wish to adopt its Ethics
Rules, the IBA recommends the following clause be added to the arbitration clause
or arbitration agreement: "The parties agree that the rules of Ethics for
International Arbitrators established by the International Bar Association, in force
at the date of the commencement of any arbitration under this clause, shall be
applicable to the arbitrators appointed in respect of such arbitration." Id.
Id. para. L-08, reprinted in ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND
122.
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 640 (3d ed. 1999). It should
be noted that the IBA Rules also require the arbitrators to "do their best to
conduct the arbitration in such a manner that costs do not rise to an
unreasonable proportion of the interests at stake.' Id. para. L-09, reprinted in
ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 640 (3d ed. 1999). As more fully explained in Part IV.E, infra, the
charging of cancellation or commitment fees probably would not unreasonably
increase the costs of the arbitration.
CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N ON ETHICS & STANDARDS IN ADR, PROPOSED
123.
MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR THE LAWYER AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL
(Draft for Comment, Apr. 1999), available at http://www.cpradr.org/cprgeorge.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2000).
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role, such as a mediator or arbitrator. 12 4 Although it contains a
section discussing the fees of the third party neutral, it does not
explicitly address the payment of cancellation or commitment
fees. It requires, inter alia, that the basis, rate, and allocation of
the third party neutral's fees be set forth in writing to all125parties,
unless he or she is serving in a no-fee or pro bono basis.
In short, none of the rules or codes governing the conduct of
arbitrators in international arbitrations expressly prohibit the
payment of cancellation or commitment fees. In addition, a few of
these arbitral ethics codes, including the code of the most widely
used arbitral body in the United States, expressly or implicitly
allow for the payment of cancellation fees. Just as importantly,
the codes and guidelines call for reasonable fee arrangements.
Thus, as long as cancellation and commitment fees are part of a
fairly negotiated agreement, they should be permissible.
C. Applicability of Rules ConcerningLiquidated Damages and
Penaltiesto Cancellationand Commitment Fees

Survey respondents were also uncertain whether cancellation
or commitment fees were prohibited by local laws, the most
relevant of which are laws regulating the payment of liquidated
damages and penalties. To date, there are no statutes or cases in
the United States directly addressing whether cancellation or
commitment fees are permitted or prohibited under such laws.
While the validity of particular agreements to pay cancellation or
commitment fees under laws regulating liquidated damages and
penalties would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis, it

124. Id. pmbl., availableat http://www.cpradr.org/cpr-george.html.
125. Id. R. 4.5.5, available at http://www.cpradr.org/cpr-george.html.
rule provides:

The

(a) Before or within a reasonable time after being retained as a third party
neutral, a lawyer should communicate to the parties, in writing, the basis
or rate and allocation of the fee for service, unless the third party neutral is
serving in a no-fee or pro bono capacity.
(b) A third party neutral who withdraws from a case should return any
unearned fee to the parties.
(c) A third party neutral who charges a fee contingent on the settlement or
other specific resolution of the matter should explain to the parties that
such an arrangement gives the third party neutral a direct financial
interest in settlement that may conflict with the parties' possible interest in
terminating the proceedings without reaching settlement. The third party
neutral should consider whether such a fee arrangement creates an
appearance or actuality of partiality, inconsistent with the requirements of
Rule 4.5.3.
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appears that, as a general proposition, these fees would not be
void per se.126
In the United States, a contract clause stipulating the
amount of damages to be paid in the event of a breach may be
considered either as a liquidated damages clause or a penalty
clause.1 2 7 The distinction between the two is crucial. Courts
typically enforce liquidated damages clauses on the grounds that
they provide certainty as to the amount of recoverable damages
and they save parties time and money by eliminating the need for
litigation as a result of a breach of contract. 128 By contrast,
courts have held penalty clauses invalid because they have an "in
terrorem effect"; that is, they function to coerce a party into
performing and punish that party for failing to perform. 12 9 The
purpose of a penalty clause also is contrary to the compensation
principle behind the awarding of contractual remedies because
the stipulated sum exceeds the amount of damages that a court
would have awarded to the nonbreaching party. As a result, a
penalty clause places the non-breaching party in a far better
position than it would have enjoyed had the contract been
30
performed.'
There exists no uniform approach to distinguish a liquidated
damages clause from a penalty clause.' 3 ' To determine whether
an amount specified in an agreement is a valid liquidated
damages clause or an invalid penalty clause, jurisdictions

126.
It is arguable that a commitment fee is earned when paid and thus the
rules concerning liquidated damages and penalties would be inapplicable to such
a fee. K/S Norjarl A/S v. Hyundai Heavy Indus. Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 524, 532
(Leggatt, L.J.). However, a commitment fee also may be construed as a deposit
that one party must forfeit in the event of a breach and to which American courts
would apply a liquidated damages analysis in evaluating its validity. Cf. 3 DAN B.
DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.9(4) (2d ed. 1993).
127.
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages,Penalties and
the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a
Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554, 554-55 (1977).
128.
Leeber v. Deltona Corp., 546 A.2d 452, 455 (Me. 1988); DOBBS, supra
note 126, §§ 12.9(1), 12.9(3). For a detailed discussion of liquidated damages,
which is beyond the scope of this article, see 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS §§ 1054-74 (1964); DOBBS, supra note 126, §§ 12.9(1)-12.9(5); 5
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 781A (3d ed. 1961).
129. CORBIN, supranote 128, § 1058, at 340; Scott M. Tyler, Note, No (Easy)
Way Out: 'Liquidating" Stipulated Damages for Contractor Delay in Public
Construction Contracts, 44 DUKE L.J. 357, 373 (1994).
130.
Goetz & Scott, supra note 127, at 560-61. If the stipulated sum is
deemed a penalty, the nonbreaching party may still recover his or her actual
damages. Mellor v. Budget Advisors, Inc., 415 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1969);
Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311, 314 (N.Y. 1972); City of Kinston v.
Suddreth, 146 S.E.2d 660, 662-63 (N.C. 1966).
131.
Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., Liquidated Damages v. Penalties:Sense or
Nonsense, Wis. L. REv. 351, 352-53 (1978).
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typically have considered one or more of the following factors: (1)
the intention of the parties; (2) the difficulty of ascertaining
32
damages; and (3) the reasonableness of the stipulated sum.'
1. Parties' Intent
A few courts have held that whether a clause calling for the
payment of a fixed sum in the event of a breach is a liquidated
damages clause or a penalty clause depends on the intent of the
parties. l3 3 Where the purpose of the clause is to fix the amount
to be paid in lieu of performance, it is more likely to be a
liquidated damages provision. By contrast, where the purpose of
the clause is to secure performance, it is more likely to be a
penalty.' 3 4 The intent of the parties is typically determined from
the surrounding circumstances and whether the parties
described the stipulated sum in question as "liquidated damages"
or a "penalty." 13 5 It should be noted, however, that the intent of
the parties is rarely the overriding factor today in determining
whether a provision is a valid liquidated damages clause or an
13 6
invalid penalty clause.

2. Difficulty in Ascertaining Damages
Some courts will uphold a provision as a liquidated damages
clause only if the damages resulting are uncertain or difficult to
ascertain.1 3 7 Courts that employ this factor divide over the time

132.
E.g., Honey Dew Assocs., Inc. v. M & K Food Corp., 81 F.Supp.2d 352,
357 (D. R.I. 2000); Mechanical Air Eng'g Co. v. Totem Constr. Co., 801 P.2d 426,
429 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Kelly v. Marx, 705 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Mass. 1999);
Baker v. International Record Syndicate, Inc., 812 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. App. 1991).
133.
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105, 120 (1907); Safeco
Credit v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 406, 413 (1999); In re Grahm Square, Inc., 126
F.3d 823, 831 (6th Cir. 1997); Kirkland Distrib. Co. v. United States, 276 F.2d
138, 144 (4th Cir. 1960); Rohlin Constr. Co. v. City of Hinton, 476 N.W.2d 78, 81
(Iowa 1991). See also William Kenneth Dix, Note, The Use and Abuse of Liquidated
Damages in FederalDefense Contracts:An Analysis, 8 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 251,
255 (1983); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 694-97 (1988); Annotation, Contractual
Provision for PerDiem Payments for Delay in Performance as One for Liquidated
Damages orPenalty, 12 A.L.R. 4th 891, 900 (1982).
134.
Gitlin v. Schneider, 247 N.Y.S.2d 779, 788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964);
Abramson v. Rashti, 373 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); DOBBS, supra
note 126, § 12.9(2).
135.
CORdIN, supra note 128, § 1058, at 339.
136.
Comment, Liquidated Damages and Penalties Under the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Common Law: An Economic Analysis of Contract
Damages, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 1055, 1061-1063 (1978) (citing cases).
137.
Bruce Builders, Inc. v. Goodwin, 317 So.2d 868, 869-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975); Pacheco v. Scoblionko, 532 A.2d 1036, 1038 (Me. 1987); Dairy Farm
Leasing Co. v. Hartley, 395 A.2d 1135, 1137 (Me. 1978); Walter Implement, Inc. v.
Focht, 730 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Wash. 1987). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671(d)

2000]

SETTING ARBITRATORS' FEES

when the damages must be difficult to estimate. Some courts
have ruled that the stipulated damages must be difficult to
Other
estimate at the time that the contract was formed.' 3 8
courts have held that the stipulated damages must be difficult to
13 9
estimate at the time of trial.
3. Reasonableness of Stipulated Sum
The most important criterion used by courts to distinguish a
liquidated damages clause from a penalty clause is that a
provision fixing the amount of damages in the event of
nonperformance will be considered a valid liquidated damages
clause if the stipulated sum is reasonably related to the actual
140
loss that the party would sustain in the event of a breach.
There are two points in time at which courts examine the
reasonableness of the stipulated sum:
(1) at the time of
14 1
contracting (ex ante); or (2) at the time of breach (ex post).
Most jurisdictions have adopted the ex ante view, requiring that
the stipulated amount be reasonable in view of the damages

(West 1985) (permitting liquidated damages clauses in certain consumer
transactions when "it would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the
actual damage").
138.
Colonial at Lynnfield, Inc. v. Sloan, 870 F.2d 761, 765 (1st Cir. 1989);
Hanlon Drydock & Shipbuilding Co. v. G.W. McNear, Inc., 70 Cal. App. 204, 213
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 858 P.2d
1363, 1369 (Utah 1993); CORBIN, supra note 128, § 1060, at 350; Clarkson et al.,
supra note 131, at 354.
139.
E.g., Massey v. Love, 478 P.2d 948, 950 (Okla. 1971). See also DOBBS,
supra note 126, § 12.9(2), at 251.
140.
Clarkson et al., supranote 131, at 356-57.
141.
Under the ex ante test, the stipulated amount must be a reasonable
forecast of the harm likely to result from a breach. By contrast, under the ex post
test, the stipulated amount must be comparable to the actual damages resulting
from the breach. Eric L. Talley, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and
the Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1200-01 (1994).
The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts states:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but
only at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or
actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A
term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages in unenforceable on
grounds of public policy as a penalty.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981).

See also Susan V. Ferris,
Note, Liquidated Damages Recovery Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 862 (1982); U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978) ("Damages for breach...
may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in
the light of the anticipated or actual harm ... the difficulties of proof of loss, and
the inconvenience or non-feasibility of... obtaining an adequate remedy.").
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at the time of contracting. 14 2 If there are no actual
however, some jurisdictions refuse to enforce a
damages clause even when the fixed amount is
under the ex ante test. 143

4. Applying the Factors
Jurisdictions also are divided over which factor or factors are
to be used to distinguish liquidated damages clauses from penalty
clauses. 1'
For example, under California law, "a provision in a
contract liquidating the damages for the breach of the contract is
valid unless the party seeking to invalidate the provision
establishes that the provision was unreasonable under the
circumstances existing at the time the contract was made." 14 S In

New York, in order for a promise to pay a pre-estimated amount
of damages in the event of a breach to be upheld as liquidated
damages, the stipulated amount must bear "a reasonable
proportion to the probable loss and the amount of actual loss
[must be] incapable or difficult of precise estimation." 1'
By
contrast, Georgia courts require all three factors to be considered
142.
California & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433,
1438 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987); Growney v. C M H Real
Estate Co., 238 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Neb. 1976); Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co., 377 N.W.2d 593, 599 (Wis. 1985); Phillip R. Kaplan, Note, A Critique of the
Penalty Limitation on Liquidated Damages, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (1977).
But see Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co., 220 A.2d 263, 268
(Conn. 1966) ("It is not the function of the court to determine by hindsight the
reasonableness of the expectation of the parties at the time the contract was made
....
"); Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ind. 1973) (considering
amount paid in relation to the total contract price and concluding that a forfeiture
as liquidated damages was inequitable).
A stipulated sum to be paid in the event of a breach that passes the ex ante
and ex post tests would be upheld, and conversely, a stipulated sum that fails
both tests would be invalid. It is unlikely that a stipulated sum will fail the ex
ante test but pass the ex post test. The greatest amount of confusion appears to
surround those stipulated sums that pass the ex ante test but fail the ex post test.
Traditionally, once a stipulated sum passes the ex ante test, actual damages were
deemed irrelevant. One commentator writes that the current trend among courts
is to invalidate a stipulated sum that fails the ex post test, regardless of if it were
reasonable ex ante. Talley, supranote 141, at 1202-03.
143.
Colonial at Lynnfield, Inc, 870 F.2d at 765; Freedman v. Rector,
Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Mathias Parish, 230 P.2d 629, 632 (Cal. 1951);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981).
144.
DOBBS, supra note 126, §12.9(2), at 247-52; Comment, supra note 136,
at 1060-69.
145.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671(b) (West 1985).
146.
Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 361 N.E.2d
1015, 1018 (N.Y. 1977).
See also Thanksgiving Tower Partners v. Anros
Thanksgiving Partners, 64 F.3d 227, 232 (5th Cir. 1995); Pace Communications,
Inc. v. Moonlight Design Inc., 31 F.3d 587, 593 (7th Cir. 1994); Hyman v. Cohen,
73 So.2d 393, 401 (Fla. 1954); Kelly v. Marx, 705 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Mass.
1999).
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in determining whether a provision fidng a sum to be paid in the
event of a breach constitutes a liquidated damages clause or a
penalty clause. 14 7
Cancellation fees and non-refundable commitment fees
appear to meet the three requirements necessary to be upheld as
valid liquidated damages clauses. 148 First, the parties and the
arbitrator intend the fees as compensation for time reserved but
ultimately never used, and not as a penalty. The purpose of
cancellation and commitment fees is not to punish the parties for
settling or to dissuade them from doing so.149
Rather, in
imposing such fees, the parties intend to alleviate the financial
loss to the arbitrators that arises from last minute cancellations
of hearings that leave the arbitrators without the opportunity to
secure comparably remunerative work. 150
Second,
losses
arising
from
missed
employment
opportunities are uncertain and are difficult to measure both at
the time that the contract was formed and at the time of trial. At
the time of contracting, it would be virtually impossible to
calculate with any degree of certainty the damages that the
arbitrator would sustain if the parties canceled the hearing. This
is because the loss would depend on, inter alia, when the parties
notified the arbitrator of the cancellation and what opportunities
were available to the arbitrator to secure comparable work for the
days that were set aside for the hearing. At the time of trial,
calculating the damages sustained by the arbitrator may be
somewhat easier, but doing so arguably would still be wrought

147. AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams, 444 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Ga. 1994) (stating that
to determine whether a contract provision is enforceable as liquidated damages
"[tjhe injury must be difficult to estimate accurately, the parties must intend to
provide damages instead of a penalty, and the sum must be a reasonable estimate
of the probable loss"). See also St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 536 N.W.2d
24, 28 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (requiring that the following three elements must be
present in order to find a valid liquidated damages clause: (1) the parties must
have intended to liquidate damages, (2) at the time of contracting, the stipulated
amount was a reasonable estimate of actual damages, and (3) at the time of
contracting, it was difficult to determine the actual amount of damages).
148.
Cf. Jack L. Sammons, Legal Ethics, 46 MERCER L. REV. 305, 318 (1994).
Sammons argues that an attorney should be able to collect a stipulated sum as an
advance against a client's termination without cause if the contractual method for
determining the amount bears some reasonable relationship to the actual
damages. Sammons suggests that the other two requirements would be satisfied
because (1) the loss to the attorney, ie., the value of work foregone, would be
difficult to measure, and (2) the sum would not be imposed as a penalty but
rather as protection against projected losses.
149.
See infra Part IV.E (noting that cancellation and commitment fees do
not have a significantly adverse effect on the parties' ability to settle the case).
150.
See supra notes 30, 36 and accompanying text.
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with difficulties. As Lord Justice Leggatt explained in K/S Norjarl
A/S v. Hyundai Heavy Indus.:
[It is] impracticable [to] suggest[ ] that... clients might be prepared
to reimburse the arbitrators for such actual loss as could be shown
to have been incurred by reason of settlement before the end of the
period reserved. Arbitrators cannot reasonably be invited to agree
to such an amorphous arrangement. It would in any event provide
a fruitful source of discord, which might involve proof of the
amount of the arbitrators' actual earning during the relevant period
as well as the reasons why they had not availed themselves of
particular opportunities of work. 151
Third, while it is difficult to predict in the abstract whether a
particular cancellation or commitment fee provision would be
reasonably related to the actual loss sustained by the arbitrator
in the event that a hearing was canceled, so long as the fee
generally approximates the actual damages sustained by the
arbitrator, it would satisfy the reasonableness test.' s 2 In some
jurisdictions, if the arbitrator is able to secure comparable
alternate employment after the parties cancel, the arbitrator does
not collect a cancellation or commitment fee, even if the amount
of the fee is reasonable under the ex ante test.' S3 Thus, while
cancellation and commitment fees probably would not be
considered perse invalid penalties, l S 4 whether a particular clause
is enforceable as liquidated damages is generally determined on a
case-by-case basis, and the result is unpredictable given the state
of the law in this area. l s s
D. The Impact of Cancellationand Commitment Fees on
the Cost of the Arbitrationand Settlement
Critics of cancellation and commitment fees argue that they
increase the cost of arbitrations and hinder the parties' ability to
settle the case.' 5 6 It appears, however, that the payment of such

151. K/S Norjarl A/S v. Hyundai Heavy Indus. Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 524, 533
(Leggatt, L.J.).
152.
See supra text accompanying notes 140-43. In fact, cancellation and
commitment fees typically do not exceed the daily hearing rate normally charged
by arbitrators, and the amount of the fee is often based on a percentage of the fee
for a daily hearing rate. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Thus, the
cancellation or commitment fee may be less than actual damages suffered by the
arbitrators from the canceling of the hearing.
153. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
154. Cf. Union-Scioto Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Unioto Support Ass'n,
603 N.E.2d 375, 377 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (stating that, although the validity of
the arbitrator's cancellation fee was not at issue, "[i]t is not unreasonable,
arbitrary or unconscionable to assess the arbitration cancellation fee to the party
who was instrumental in obtaining such a cancellation").
155. Tyler, supra note 129, at 357-58; Comment, supranote 136, at 1061.
156.
See supraPart III.B.5.
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fees has little effect on either the cost of the arbitrations or the
parties' ability to settle.
Charging cancellation and commitment fees appears to
increase the overall cost of arbitrations because it requires the
parties to pay a portion of hearing costs, regardless of whether
the hearings actually take place. Without such fees, however, the
last minute cancellation of hearings would often leave arbitrators
with no compensation for time reserved and without the
opportunity to secure comparable remunerative work.1s 7 To
compensate for lost income resulting from cancellations,
arbitrators are likely to adjust their billing rates to reflect the
anticipated lost employment so that their expected profits would
still be realized. Indeed, it is common practice for lawyers in the
United States to consider lost employment opportunities in
setting their hourly billing rates.1 5 8 Accordingly, without the use
of cancellation and commitment fees, the parties would generally
pay higher rates for all services performed by the arbitrators. It is
therefore unclear whether the use of cancellation and
commitment fees actually increases the cost of arbitrations.
Cancellation and commitment fees also are unlikely to have a
significant impact on the parties' ability to settle the dispute. In
general, settlement can occur when the minimum amount that
the claimant is willing to accept is lower than the maximum
amount that the respondent is willing to pay.1 5 9 The difference
between these two dollar amounts is commonly referred to as the
settlement range. 160 In theory, agreeing to any number within
this range would place both the claimant and respondent in a
better position than if they proceeded with the arbitration. 16 1

157.
See supra text accompanying notes 30, 36.
158.
2 LAW OFFICE ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT MANUAL § 24:01 (Paul S.
Hoffman ed., 1986) (listing six considerations to be taken into account in
determining the amount of a lawyer's fee: the "time he spent"; the 'work he did";
the "skill he used"; the 'difficulty of the question"; "[whether he lost other
employment"; and "[wjhether his fee is certain, for a regular client, or is contingent
on the result he obtains " ) (emphasis added); 1 MARY ANN ALTMAN & ROBERT I. WEIL,
HOW TO MANAGE YOUR LAW OFFICE § 4.02[1] (1999) (noting that attorneys set their

hourly billing rates at an amount that is equal to sum of their internal production
costs plus their desired profits).
159. THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 157-58 (1997); Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedureand JudicialAdministration, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 399, 417 (1973).
160.

See generally A.

MITCHELL POLINSKY,

AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND

ECONOMICS 108 tbl. 12 (2d ed. 1989) (showing an example of how one may
calculate the settlement range from the amount in dispute).
161.

ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 356 (2d ed. 1997).

By agreeing to a settlement within the range, both parties save the costs of
litigation and divide those savings in such a way that both are made better off. Id.
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The minimum amount that the claimant will settle for is
equal to the present value of claimant's estimate of the amount
awarded by the tribunal if claimant wins at arbitration (A,),
multiplied by the claimant's estimate of the probability that the
claimant will win at arbitration (Pe), minus the costs of the
arbitration, including attorneys' fees (C.), plus claimant's
settlement costs (S.,).162 In other words, claimant's minimum
offer would be equal to:
AcPc - C. + Sc

The maximum amount that the respondent will offer to settle the
dispute is equal to the present value of respondent's estimate of
the amount awarded by the tribunal if respondent loses at
arbitration (Ar), multiplied by the respondent's estimate of the
probability that the respondent will lose at arbitration (Pr), plus
the costs of the arbitration, including attorneys' fees (Cr), minus
respondent's settlement costs (Sr). In other words, respondent's
maximum offer would be equal to:
ArPr + Cr - Sr

The following examples illustrate the application of these
principles. Assume that the stakes in the dispute are $1 million
to each side and each party believes that it has a fifty percent
chance of winning. 16 3 In addition, assume that the cost of the
arbitration to each party is $200,000, and that this amount
includes each party's legal costs and half of the costs and fees of
the tribunal. Also assume that the parties are risk neutral.16 4 If

162.
Posner, supra note 159, at 418-19. See also Stewart J. Schwab &
Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the
Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 719,
742-43 (1988); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to
Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 112-13
(1994).
163.
In reality, both parties are unlikely to share the same belief about the
probability of the claimant's success at trial. If the claimant is pessimistic about
the probability of prevailing at trial (relative to the respondent's belief about the
plaintiffs prevailing), then the settlement range will increase. If the claimant is
optimistic about the probability of prevailing at trial (relative to the respondent's
belief about the plaintiffs prevailing), then the settlement range will decrease or,
possibly, disappear. POLINSKY, supranote 160, at 109-11.
164.
Risk neutral parties compare the value of settlement to their expected
values and select whichever promises more value; that is, neither party is biased
towards litigation or settlement. Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A
Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 163, 170 (2000). In many disputes,
however, the parties are risk averse. Risk averse parties are more likely to settle
for two reasons. First, a risk averse claimant will value a suit at less than the
expected value of a trial (in other words, the claimant will subtract a 'risk
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we ignore for the moment the costs of settlement, the claimant
would be willing to accept anything above $300,000 to settle the
dispute, 165 while the respondent would be willing to settle the
dispute for anything less than $700,000.166 Thus, the size of the
settlement range is $400,000.167
Many disputes are settled prior to the tribunal reaching a
final award because, among other things, settlements save the
costs of arbitration. 168 As noted, however, there are costs
These costs typically include
associated with settlement. 169
lawyers' fees and the parties' time spent in negotiating the
settlement. 1 70 Thus, if in the above example the settlement cost
to each party is $20,000, the claimant would now be willing to
17 1
while the
accept anything above $320,000 to settle the dispute,
respondent would be willing to settle the dispute for anything less
The size of the settlement range is now
$680,000.172
$360,000.173
In the event of settlement, the payment of a commitment or
cancellation fee arguably should be considered a settlement cost.
This is because such fee would be paid by the parties as a direct
result of settling the dispute. If so, this fee would, like other
settlement costs, have the effect of reducing the likelihood of
settlement. To illustrate, assume that each party also is required
to pay half of a $6,000 cancellation fee if they settled the dispute
before the hearing date. The claimant, who was originally willing
to accept anything more that $320,000 to settle the dispute,
would now only be willing to accept an amount greater than
premium" from the expected value to account for his aversion to the uncertainty of
trial); therefore, the claimant's incentive to sue is reduced. Second, risk aversion
creates an incentive for settlement because settling reduces the risk both parties
face in proceeding to trial. POLINSKY, supra note 160, at 111-12.
($1,000,000 x 50%) - 200,000 = $300,000.
165.
166.
($1,000,000 x 50%) + 200,000 = $700,000.
$700,000 - $300,000 = $400,000.
167.
See POLINSKY, supra note 160, at 109. Another major reason for
168.
settling a dispute is to remove uncertainty about the outcome of the case if
litigated. Posner, supranote 159, at 421.
It also should be noted, as Judge Posner points out, that:
169.
the costs of litigation and of settlement are [not] mutually independent
A change in the stakes will affect the amount of money that the
....
parties spend on litigation and this in turn will alter the probabilities of a
particular outcome. Settlement costs are probably a function of both
litigation costs and stakes.
Posner, supra note 159, at 419.
Robert Cooter et al., Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: A Testable
170.
Model of StrategicBehavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 238 (1982).
(($1,000,000 x 50%) - 200,000) + $20,000 = $320,000.
171.
172.
(($1,000,000 x 50%) + 200,000) - $20,000 = $680,000.
173. $680,000 - $320,000 = $360,000.
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Conversely, if the respondent would have been
$323,000.174
willing to pay anything less than $680,000 to settle the dispute,
the cancellation fee would decrease the respondent's maximum
offer to $677,000.175 Thus, the payment of the cancellation fee
reduces the settlement range from $360,000 to $354,000.176
Although the payment of cancellation and commitment fees
theoretically increases the likelihood of the dispute being decided
by the arbitral tribunal, the effect on settlement is probably
minimal. The amount of such fees in relation to the costs that
will be incurred by the parties if the matter is decided through
arbitration is likely to be so small as to have no effect in reality on
settlement. 177
Charging cancellation and commitment fees thus does not
appear to substantially increase the cost of arbitrations. Without

such fees, arbitrators may increase their rates to compensate for
lost employment opportunities.
Likewise, cancellation and
commitment fees do not appear to hinder the parties' ability to
settle. They do not significantly reduce the settlement range, and

the fees are so low compared to the costs of proceeding with
arbitration that, in most cases,
attractive alternative to arbitration.

V.

settlement

will

remain

an

CONCLUSION

The study of the fee practices of arbitrators in international
arbitrations reveals a broad consensus on the methods for
determining the fees of arbitrators. Most arbitrators calculate

174.
(($1,000,000 x 50%) - 200,000) + $23,000 = $323,000.
175.
(($1,000,000 x 50%) + 200,000) - $23,000 = $677,000.
176.
$677,000 - $323,000 = $354,000.
177.
Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1075 (1989) (noting
that "trial costs are so much greater than settlement costs that many authors
choose the simplifying assumption that settlement costs are nil").
Arguably,
cancellation and commitment fees may even facilitate settlement because they fix
hearing dates and, therefore, set a form of deadline for the parties to settle the
dispute. To explain, although settlement can occur at any time in the legal
process, bargaining often intensifies in the days preceding the start of trial. This
is done in a last-minute attempt to avoid the expenses associated with resolving a
dispute in a court of law. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 161, at 355. Of the
estimated more than seventy percent of cases that are resolved prior to trial, a
large percentage settle on the eve of trial or even after the trial has begun.
Richard M. Calkins, Mediation: The Gentler Way, 41 S.D. L. REV. 277, 283 (1996).
When parties resort to arbitration as an alternative to traditional litigation, the
costs are still considerable, and the desire to resolve the conflict in the least
expensive manner is still an overriding objective. Therefore, the likelihood of
settlement before the arbitration hearing begins, but after the dates have already
been booked, may be considerable.
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their remuneration using the time-based method, except when
the arbitral institution requires that their fees be determined
under an ad valorem method. However, there appears to be little
uniformity on the types of fees that may be charged.
In
particular, arbitrators are greatly divided over whether it is
appropriate to charge cancellation or commitment fees. In the
United States, cancellation and commitment fees currently are
not widely used by arbitrators who hear transnational disputes.
The author predicts, however, that in the coming years their use
will increase because arbitral institutions are permitting the
payment of cancellation and commitment fees, there appears to
be little ethical or legal impediments to the use of cancellation
and commitment fees, and these fees would not adversely affect
in a significant way the arbitration or the resolution of the
dispute.

